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This study investigates how well the goals of local officials align with the stated 
goals of HOPE VI in the case of the Liberty Green development in Louisville, KY.   
Research revealed that there it is not necessarily the goals of decision makers that are in 
conflict, but the stated goals of HOPE VI themselves stand in conflict with one another.  
Two major components of HOPE VI are in constant tension—the impact on residents and 
neighborhood development goals.  Evidence from this study suggests that most of the 
emphasis for the Liberty Green HOPE VI development revolves around neighborhood 
and community development goals. And self-sufficiency, while a goal of the HOPE VI 
program, remains secondary.  
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We have been preoccupied with the geography rather than the existence of poverty primarily because the 
central cities remain, in fact, the functional hearts of all metropolitan areas, the home base of America's 
media and opinion elite. Because the social problems of the metropolitan poor are concentrated in every 
urban region's core, they are highly visible to the leaders and visitors of metropolitan America, and they 
are disruptive of its image, enjoyment, and perhaps even its economic life (Salins 1993: 92). 
 
Urban poverty has demanded substantial attention and widespread debate over the 
years.  Salins (1993) offers that urban poverty has received so much attention because all 
US metropolitan areas house a larger number of poor who not only contend with poverty 
but also suffer from many attendant social problems, social problems that mar the ideal 
image of the city.  During the 1980s urban poverty garnered more attention than ever 
before.  Between 1980 and 1990 the number of people living in high poverty 
metropolitan areas increased 52%.  There were big concerns about this drastic increase in 
poverty.  This economic downturn was characterized by a decline in manufacturing and 
growth within the service sector.   The work of William Julius Wilson suggested that the 
limited economic opportunities in high poverty areas translated into high rates of 
unemployment and increased crime.  Furthermore, there was evidence to support this 
thesis.  Between 1979 and 1989 violent crime increased 33% (Katz 2009). 
Because of the high concentration of poor living in public housing, these issues of 
poverty became a salient issue for the department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD).  In the face of these social problems associated with concentrated poverty HUD 
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underwent an ideological change wherein the goal of public housing was expanded to 
include the notion that public housing should generate a broader community and 
eliminate poverty (Katz 2009).  The Hope VI program originated as a part of Urban 
Revitalization Demonstration (URD) under Jack Kemp in the 1990s and since then 
HOPE VI has been the largest avenue for the demolition of public housing.  
In 1989 congress established the National Commission on Severely Distressed 
Public Housing.  The commission investigated the state of public housing over an 18-
month period.  Its final report concluded that 86,000 of the 1.3 million public housing 
units were severely distressed.  The commission proposed the National Action Plan, 
which called for increased funding for support services, the development of mixed 
income communities, and an increase of funding of $7.5 million for the rehabilitation and 
replacement of public housing units (Katz 2009).  HOPE VI provided funding for 
demolition to public housing authorities (PHAs) that could demonstrate that a housing 
project was severely distressed (Goetz 2011b).  The definition of severe distress is 
ambiguous; it can be everything from low incomes, high crime, high vacancy, or physical 
deterioration (Goetz 2011b; Harvard Law Review 2003).  As of 2002 HOPE VI had 
allocated $5.3 billion to 193 HOPE VI sites across the country (Curley 2005).  However 
the program has been far from a raging success. 
HOPE VI has been criticized of heavily relying on design principles and other 
scholars have questioned the motives for the focus on physical design.  According to Jeff 
Crump (2002), urban politians and public officials favor deconcentration because 
demolition allows for reimaging of city as a safe zone of commerce by erasing the 
stigmatized structures of public housing (p.582).  Brown-Saracino and Rumpf (2011) add, 
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“media imagery underlining ‘blight’ partially enables revitalization” because the imagery 
neutralizes public protest of the social cost accompanying the changes (p.291).  
Furthermore demolition opens up land to bring middle and upper class families back to 
the city (Crump 2002: 582).   
In reimaging the city HUD subscribed to New Urbanism designs in an effort to 
entice middle and upper income families back to the city.  New Urbanism promotes 
walkability and smaller scale buildings opposed the superblocks and high rise towers that 
characterized some of the most dangerous housing projects in the U.S (Calthrope 2009).  
In order to pursue this design movement congress lifted the one-for-one rule, which 
required one unit to be built for everyone that was torn down, in 1995 (Cisneros 2009; 
Duryea 2006).  Demolition and New Urbanism erased the blight that had come to be 
associated with so many inner cities.  By making the city appealing the potential buyers, 
New Urbanism, also aided in recruiting investors from the private market. 
HOPE VI emphasizes leveraging private capital.  The degree to which a HOPE VI 
proposal will leverage private investment is actually a scored component on the 
application (Cunningham 2001; Harvard Law Review 2003) and applications that 
leveraged a higher ratio of private funds were rated higher (Duryea 2006:577; Harvard 
Law Review 2003).  Hanlon (2010) says that mixed financing objectives have significant 
social and economic cost.  There is a large amount of competition for limited amount of 
funds and HOPE VI developments tend to take away funds from other housing projects 
that don’t receive a grant but are in need of renovations because of contributions that 
local housing authorities have to make to the capital fund budget (Hanlon 2010).  
Furthermore, the demolition of public housing contributes to long waiting lists for public 
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housing subsidies.  Lastly, one must also consider that profit motivation is a large part of 
what draws private capital. 
The above critiques are actually matters of gentrification.  In cities where the 
market pressure for gentrification has been the most intense demolition of public housing 
has been the most aggressive (Goetz 2011a). In 1998 the Government Office of 
Accounting (GOA) acknowledged that, “as the HOPE VI program has evolved, its focus 
has shifted from revitalizing the most severely distressed public housing sites to 
transforming distressed sites with the capacity to leverage outside resources into mixed-
income communities” (as qtd. Harvard Law Review 2003: 1484).  In light of this, public-
private partnerships have the potential to devastate relatively stable housing projects and 
displace former residents in second rate housing (Cunningham 2001).  Several analysts 
have argued that the level of distress has actually played a small role in the allocation of 
HOPE VI funds, instead areas that were able to attract private investment have been 
given preference (Duryea 2006; Goetz 2011a; Harvard Law Review; Keene and 
Geronimus 2011), and according to Goetz (2011) in the early 1990s pressures of 
gentrification were actually a leading predictor of demolition across the nation.   
The demolition of public housing warrants particular consideration because of its 
disruptive impact on the lives of the poor.  Because of the focus on physical design, the 
prime location of housing projects, and the preference given to developments that can 
achieve spillover effects one is left to wonder if HOPE VI is a vehicle for gentrification.   
The motives of the major players involved in a HOPE VI development may be different 
or even contradictory from the officially stated goals of HOPE VI.  This goal conflict 
may impede the effectiveness of the program.  In this paper I investigate how well the 
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goals of local officials align with the stated goals of HOPE VI in the case of the Liberty 
Green development in Louisville, KY.  To date few studies have investigated whether 
gentrification is a goal of HOPE VI.  Furthermore, there are few case studies on Liberty 
Green.  Because of Liberty Green’s location in downtown Louisville and the rapid 
growth occurring in surrounding neighborhoods it is an ideal development to investigate 
for evidence of gentrification by examining the motives of local officials involved in the 
development.  This study extends the literature on HOPE VI to include a more robust 
treatment of gentrification and the role of cities in HOPE VI developments.   
In the remainder of this thesis I summarize the key theoretical frameworks and 
research related to the demolition of public housing and the history of HOPE VI (Chapter 
2).  Chapter 3 entails a full description of the employed a case study which included 
interviews with local stakeholders and government officials, a selection of quantitative 
data drawn from the US Census, Louisville Metro Police, and the Louisville Revenue 
Commission.  Chapter 4 is the analysis of the data.  Finally in Chapter 5, I discuss my 





REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Since its inception public housing has undergone several reinventions.  Early 
housing projects first appeared during the Great Depression.  They were part of the New 
Deal public works; they generated construction jobs, which helped combat 
unemployment (Curly 2005; Goetz 2011b, Vale and Freemark 2012). They were 
envisioned as a temporary solution for the working class (Wilson 2008).  Ecological 
theory, the dominant paradigm of the time, viewed poor urban neighborhoods as 
transitional and functional for the larger metropolis.  As we know today many 
neighborhoods of extreme poverty are not temporary, and research has shown that people 
rarely change social class during their lifetime (Wilson [1987] 2012).  Human ecology 
was inadequate for explaining persistent poverty.  Around the 1960s the human 
ecological perspective fell out of popularity.  It was denounced for ignoring factors other 
than market forces that can shape the movement of groups and land use (Curley 2005). 
In the 1960s under the Johnson Administration anti-poverty policy shifted from 
the New Deal strategy of physical investment to a War on Poverty approach, which 
emphasized welfare, transfer payments, job creation, economic opportunity, 
neighborhood planning, and empowerment (Heathcott 2012).  During the New Deal era, 
families receiving welfare were excluded, but by the 1960s there was pressure to reserve 
public housing for the neediest families (Goetz 2011b, Vale and Freemark 2012).   
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The change in the public housing population was accompanied by a decrease in 
political support and disinvestment; the initiative became politically marginalized and 
underfunded (Goetz 2011b).  New Deal designs that emphasized solidarity, universalism, 
and community were abandoned due to budgetary concerns (Goetz 2011b).  Instead 
modernist designs were employed, and later became one of the most criticized aspects of 
public housing.  Modernist designs promoted mass production and segregation of use; 
they also reflected a love for the automobile.  Many of the public housing projects were 
towers that were built on super blocks.  This limited walkability, which is critical to 
healthy communities (Calthrope 2009).  Furthermore public housing was constructed in 
remote locations and isolated from the rest of the community by natural barriers (Katz 
2009; Baron 2009).  The isolation as a result of the modernist designs was believed to 
foster a dysfunctional culture.  Overall it’s believed that the modernist designs impeded 
diversity, human scale, connections, and identity (Calthrope 2009: 52).  New Urbanism 
had an answer for all of those problems.  
New Urbanism resuscitates the traditional city by bringing back walkability, 
mixed incomes, and mixed use areas.  It is widely accepted that the changes resulting 
from New Urbanism will rectify many of the pathologies associated with housing 
projects.   Janet Smith (1999), however, cautioned against this overreliance on physical 
design.  She stated that HOPE VI places too much emphasis on esthetic principles.  She 
was doubtful about a community built by physical design (Smith 1999).  Additionally 
James Hanlon (2010) stated that Park DuValle in Louisville, KY, which is often 
referenced as a success story for HOPE VI (Calthrope 2001, Clancy and Quifley 2001, 
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Engdahl 2009b, Raffel et al. 2003, Turbov and Piper 2005), is symptomatic of an 
overemphasis on planning and design. 
The time during which New Urbanism was growing in popularity was also 
characterized by suburban expansion.  Inner city populations dwindled as individuals 
moved to the suburbs.  This deteriorated the tax base and left behind a disproportionately 
poor and minority population that was vulnerable to crime (Heathcott 2012).  By the 
1970s the expansion of public housing stock ended.  The level of disinvestment reached a 
high and by the 1990s much of public housing was uninhabitable.  In dealing with social 
problems plaguing public housing, many public housing authorities effected de-facto 
demolition.    Properties were allowed to decline, units were left vacant, and 
modernization and improvement funds went unspent (Goetz 2012).  The poor living 
conditions all made the units uninhabitable, and PHAs were then able to successfully 
apply for demolition.  The disinvestment of the inner city was aided through red lining 
practices, which excluded certain neighborhoods from receiving FHA loans, and federal 
transportation and highway policies allowed freeways to be built through the heart of 
many cities, walling off poor neighborhoods from central city business districts (Wilson 
2008).  
Prior to the 1960s inner city neighborhoods had been described as exhibiting 
features of social organization, including a sense of community, positive neighborhood 
identification, and explicit norms and sanctions against deviant behavior (Wilson [1987] 
2012), but by the 1980s cities were firmly associated with crime and violence.  The 
negative image of public housing complemented the war on drugs, and there was 
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renewed interest in understanding poverty and the poor.  Urban poverty became framed 
as an issue of concentrated poverty (Goetz 2012).  
According to Goetz (2012) there have been two means of addressing concentrated 
poverty: the development of mixed income communities through programs such as 
HOPE VI, and mobility programs such as Gautreaux and Moving to Opportunity.    
These approaches have been strongly influenced by the theory of neighborhood effects. 
Neighborhood Effects 
William Julius Wilson ([1987] 2012) published his seminal book, The Truly 
Disadvantaged, in the 1980s and spurred the beginning of a new paradigm in urban 
poverty studies.  Wilson’s ([1987] 2012) theory focuses on the social changes in the city.  
He offered several interrelated explanations for the increase in social dislocations among 
the underclass including shifts in the economy, historic flow of immigrants, changes in 
urban minority age structure, population changes in the central city, and class 
transformation in the inner city, all of which have increased black joblessness and in turn 
exacerbated other problems in the inner city. 
The change in class structure in the city was significant for Wilson ([1987] 2012).  
During the 1960s there was vertical integration of different classes—the lower, working, 
and middle classes typically lived in the same neighborhoods and sent their kids to the 
same schools (Wilson [1987] 2012).  Wilson ([1987] 2012) used the phrase “social 
isolation” to illustrate the environment in which interaction between groups of different 
classes or racial backgrounds is absent.  Wilson noted that black middle class families no 
longer live in ghetto neighborhoods and therefore are unavailable to provide stability and 
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reinforce mainstream patterns and behavior (Wilson [1987] 2012). This enhances the 
effect of living in a highly concentrated poverty area (Wilson [1987] 2012).   
The change in social class structure is also the aspect of Wilson’s theory that is 
most salient for policy makers.  The logic behind HOPE VI is that mixed income 
neighborhoods will help alleviate the problems of concentrated poverty.  However, for 
Wilson ([1987] 2012) the increase in joblessness was the most devastating effect in the 
most highly concentrated areas of poverty.  The presence of the middle class may have 
mitigated or retarded the effects of concentrated poverty, but bringing the middle class 
back to these neighborhoods would do very little to help established effects of 
concentrated poverty.  These changes that took place in the inner city highlight the fact 
that culture is a response to social structural constraints and opportunities (Wilson [1987] 
2012).  Wilson stated that from a policy perspective this means “shifting focus from 
changing subcultural traits to changing structure of constraints and opportunities” 
(Wilson [1987] 2012:61).   
The middle and working class provided a social buffer against the full impact of 
joblessness.  Other institutions (churches, socials, recreational facilities) would remain 
viable if they were supported by stable and secure families (Wilson [1987] 2012).  
Without the middle and working class families the prolonged joblessness that existed in 
the 1970s and early 1980s created a ripple effect resulting in an exponential increase in 
related forms of social dislocation.  The effects of joblessness would have played out in 
neighborhoods of concentrated poverty; they were simply exacerbated without the middle 
and working class.  Therefore bringing middle-income families back to inner city 
neighborhoods did little to ameliorate the problem associated with concentrated poverty. 
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Wilson’s work spurred many studies focused on neighborhood effects, which 
have in turn influenced HOPE VI.  There are six ways that neighborhoods impact 
residents: differential quality of services available to people in different neighborhoods 
(ie., public schools, childcare, medical care), socialization of young people, peer 
influence, social networks, exposure to crime and violence, physical distance from 
employment and educational opportunities (Goetz 2003). Researchers using this 
framework have examined the relationship between neighborhood effects, unemployment, 
school dropouts, crime, and teen pregnancy.  Curley (2005) identified several studies that 
suggest that neighborhoods affect childhood development, adolescent achievement, 
delinquency, and parenting practices.  
This perspective assumes that greater economic diversity in a neighborhood will 
be beneficial for all parties including the poor.  There is evidence that high school 
graduation rates, child cognitive development, and rates of teenage child bearing can be 
sensitive to neighborhood effects (Goetz 2003).  Young (2003) cites the work of Mignon 
Moore which found that the presence of socially cohesive, stable adults offers a buffer 
against teen pregnancy.  Furthermore, living in areas of concentrated poverty can have 
adverse effects on life experiences such as isolating youth from employment 
opportunities, having inferior education, and exposure to dangerous neighborhoods and 
harmful environment conditions (Goetz 2003).   
Also from this perspective is the notion of collective socialization, which suggests 
that neighborhoods indirectly affect children by influencing parenting practices and  
offering successful adult role models and supervision (Curley 2005: 103). This 
hypothesis, which has been referred to as the role model hypothesis in several studies, 
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assumes that residents of high poverty neighborhoods are isolated to the point that they 
have no means of obtaining social leverage, that is information about jobs, resources, and 
other means of social mobility (Curly 2009, Tach 2009).  Curley (2005) cites one study 
which found that fewer productive role models leads to lower expectations a child has of 
him or herself and another study which found that IQ scores were positively correlated 
with the presence of a wealthy neighborhood.   
The role model hypothesis has several flaws.  Firstly it assumes that residents of 
housing projects have a culture that runs counter to mainstream culture.  This line of 
thinking emerged from the influence of William Julius Wilson.  According to Wilson 
concentrated poverty led to a development of an underclass that was marginalized from 
mainstream society.  As a result of this isolation members of the underclass developed an 
adaptive set of behavior norms (Goetz 2000).  
 Other researchers have shown that the concentration of poverty has adverse 
effects on a variety of life experiences such as: teenage pregnancy rates, dropout rates, 
achievement in school, isolation from employment opportunities for youth, education 
quality, and exposure to toxic waste and criminal behavior (Goetz 2000:159).  In spite of 
all this of dysfunction in high poverty neighborhoods, Tach (2009) disproves the 
assumption that the culture of housing projects is antithetical to mainstream culture.  
Most residents of housing projects have the same values as Middle America.  They want 
their children to attend college, get married, stay out of trouble, and work a steady job 
(Tach 2009:271). 
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Furthermore, the role model hypothesis assumes that physical proximity to the 
middle class will yield beneficial results for lower income residents.  In her warning 
against a reliance on physical solutions, Smith (1999) notes that proximity does not 
guarantee social contact, let alone social cohesion.  Tach (2009) found that sharing the 
same space led to no more than a modest amount of social mixing and interaction 
between income groups.  In a case study of a Boston housing project, newcomers, or the 
residents that moved to development after its rehabilitation, had fewer socialized social 
ties.  Tach (2009) suspects that newcomers distrust their neighbors, and because of this 
distrust newcomers continue to rely on their family and friends outside their 
neighborhood for social connections.  Similarly a study of Chicago’s Lake Parc Place 
indicated that while moderate-income families help create safer environments they are 
not necessarily serving as role models (Smith 1998).  Poor residents may actually resent 
an influx on middle-income newcomers who drive up property values and rent.  
Furthermore Crump (2002) cites research that indicates low-income people may be more 
circumscribed in the spatial movement, but they are still able to move through space and 
venture beyond their neighborhoods. 
Social capital is another popular explanation for neighborhood effects (Osterling 
2007).  Social capital is the connections among individuals including social networks and 
the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness (Curley 2009).  There are two types of social 
capital: social support, which helps people get by, and social leverage, which provides 
leverage (Curley 2009, Putnam 2000).  
In studies of social capital there is evidence that low-income people tend to have 
limited social networks.  In cases where they have social capital it is insular and localized, 
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in other words there is no means for social leverage (Curley 2009; Goetz 2003).  In spite 
of this characterization of the social networks of low-income individuals these networks 
are more tightly knit and characterized by higher frequencies of intense contact.  Manzo 
et al. (2008) found that 21% of  housing project residents reported watching each other’s 
children regularly, 38% gave or received rides from neighbors or helped with errands, 
33% borrowed or loaned small items or shared food, 46% stated that they watched out for 
their neighbors, and 53% believed that they could rely on others in case of an emergency.   
In many cases the distinction between the two types of social capital are glossed 
over.  When residents are forced to move from their neighborhoods they lose some social 
capital that they had built with their neighbors.  Furthermore HOPE VI ignores 
residential preferences of relocatees.  Pfeiffer (2012) finds that Blacks prefer 
integrated communities but they also prefer places with more than just a token 
proportion of Blacks.  Some of the neighborhoods that would be the most beneficial 
in improving the well-being of a low-income individual may only have a token 
proportion of blacks. Carla O’Conner (2003) argues that urban researchers have focused 
on social capital in terms of network structure and composition instead of examining the 
conditions necessary to promote the transmission of information about resources.   
Galster and Booza (2007) demonstrate that programs intended to increase social 
capital or social leverage through the creation of mixed income neighborhoods resulted in 
diminished social support.  Theorists assumed that social contact would yield social 
capital, but this has not always been the case.  In bipolar neighborhoods, which are 
characterized by extreme bimodal income distributions, the benefits of contact would not 
manifest because racial stereotypes would still mar interactions (Galster and Booza 2007).  
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Ultimately low-income residents do not gain social leverage, but end up losing access to 
things like informal childcare.  Osterling (2007) offers that community attributes such as 
economic capital, political power, and neighborhood resources all enhance social capital.  
Therefore a poor community with a strong social network that lacks political power will 
not have as much social capital.  
Today there is consensus that neighborhood effects are less important than 
originally conceived.  Furthermore the pathologies associated with concentrated poverty 
do not increase incrementally with each percentage increase in poverty (Stal and Zuberi 
2010).  Stal and Zuberi (2010) also criticized the neighborhood effect model as being 
unidirectional.  In other words it assumes that social dislocations, such as crime, are 
encouraged by simply living near others engaging in criminal behavior, but as we know 
crime is a structural problem which is caused by several factors such as labor trends, 
family upbringing, and peer pressure.   
Relatedly McClure (2008) stated there is a threshold for neighborhood effects.  
When fewer than 15 to 20% of people live below poverty it appears that problems 
associated with poverty may not have a significant negative effect on neighborhood 
conditions, but above this threshold increased poverty poses a problem.  McClure (2008) 
also stated that there is another threshold at 30-40% poverty.  Above this level the 
negative effects of concentrated poverty may have taken their toll and a greater 
concentration may not have any additional effects. 
Overall the component of deconcentrating the poor is colored by flawed 
assumptions and turbulent social conditions.  Policies developed beginning in the 1980s 
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were based on research cited above that argued that deconcentrating poverty and 
promoting mixed income communities would alleviate the issues surrounding the moral 
panic associated with drugs in the mid-1980s and all of the other pathologies that were 
associated with the poor.  It is important to examine the results of these policies.  Has 
deconcentration really occurred? Are there any other consequences? What impacts has 
deconcentration had on the lives of housing project residents?   
Deconcentrating Poverty 
 The theory of neighborhood effects has influenced public housing policy.  As 
mentioned earlier the federal government has dealt with the problems of concentrated 
poverty using two interconnected practices: developing mixed income communities and 
deconcentrating poverty.  HOPE VI has facilitated both of those strategies.  Under HOPE 
VI, municipalities transformed many former public housing sites into mixed income 
developments and relocated many residents using strategies intended to deconcentrate 
poverty.  In addition to HOPE VI projects, municipal efforts to deconcentrate poverty 
include shifting from project-based housing to tenant-based housing.  Programs operating 
under this tenet include Section 8, litigation-based measures such as Gautreuax, and 
Moving to Opportunity. 
 Today HUD.gov (2012) outlines the key components to transforming 
public housing as:  
• “Changing the physical shape of public housing 
• Lessening concentrations of poverty by placing public housing in non-poverty 
neighborhoods and promoting mixed-income communities 
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• Establishing positive incentives for resident self-sufficiency and comprehensive 
services that empower residents 
• Forging partnerships with other agencies, local governments, nonprofit 
organizations, and private businesses to leverage support and resources” 
HOPE VI along with other housing initiatives all work toward these goals.  Under 
Section 202 of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescission and Appropriations act, which was 
passed by Congress in 1996, PHAs were required to assess the viability of their housing 
stock.  If the costs of rehabilitation and maintenance for a unit exceed the cost of 
providing a rent subsidy on the private market, then the PHA was to remove the unit from 
its housing stock.  Under this act approximately 91,000 units across 35 PHAs were slated 
for demolition (Jacob 2004:233).  
 Several authors cautioned against applying these same assessment standards 
across the nation.  Stal and Zuberi (2010) warned against seeing all inner-city 
neighborhoods as homogenous.  Manzo et al. (2008) added that HOPE VI has not taken 
into account the true diversity of public housing nationwide, “severe distress became 
generalized discourse that evolved from partial understanding of 6% of public housing 
stock in the US” (p. 1873).  In spite of a partial understanding of the housing stock in the 
US federal policy has forged ahead with demolishing public housing. 
Section 8 
As public housing was demolished many residents were moved to the private 
market using section 8 vouchers.  There are three parts to Section 8 of the 1974 Housing 
and Community Development Act.  Two parts, Section 8 Substantial Rehabilitation 
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programs and Section 8 New Construction programs, were very similar to old project-
based housing programs (the subsidy was tied to the units built or rehabilitation).  Section 
8 Existing program, which most people are more familiar with, caught on quickly and 
became the second largest low-income housing program--second to public housing.  The 
program allows certificate holders to rent units in the private market. Once in the private 
market, households are responsible for paying no more 30% of their income in rent.  
Over the years Section 8 has undergone several changes.  Since its inception there have 
been reductions in geographic restrictions.  Vouchers are portable, in other words 
recipients are allowed use their vouchers across jurisdictional borders, and in 1990, the 
program was expanded to allow statewide mobility (Geotz 2003).  
Section 8 and the use of housing vouchers is in line with the goal of 
deconcentrating poverty and creating partnership.  The portable nature of vouchers allows 
for subsidized housing to spread out over a jurisdiction and providing housing vouchers 
limits the necessity of large public project by utilizing existing structures in the private 
market. 
Litigation Based Deconcentration 
Litigation-based deconcentration also reflects the political shift in public housing.  
Gautreaux is the most notable lawsuit dealing with desegregation and deconcentration.  
Dorothy Gautreaux, a long-time resident of Chicago’s public housing, sued the Chicago 
Public Housing Authority under allegations of racial discrimination.  In 1969 under the 
ruling in Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority the courts mandated that PHAs build 
in low minority neighborhoods in dispersal efforts (Goetz 2003).  The federal district 
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court found that CHA had discriminated in the siting of public housing and ordered 
scattered site units built in predominately white areas (Goetz 2003).   
A few years later a second suit was filed and in Gautreaux v. Harris the courts 
decided that housing for public housing residents should be made available on a regional 
basis.  Gautreaux v. Harris escalated to the Supreme Court, and the ruling produced what 
is now referred to as Gautreaux, a metropolitan wide mobility program (Goetz 2003).  
The program provided section 8 subsidies, which allowed approximately 7100 
participants to move out of racially segregated neighborhoods in Chicago (Goetz 2003; 
Stal and Zuberi 2010).   
The Gautreaux program provided an orientation workshop, initial credit check, 
and home visit for interested parties.  Participating families were assigned a mobility 
counselor who assisted participants to find an appropriate apartment within the allocated 
six-month timeframe, counselors also offered referrals to local service agencies and other 
information the residents might need after relocating (Geotz 2003).  However, Gautreaux 
participants, like many others relocated through deconcentration efforts, traded one poor 
black neighborhood for another (Stal and Zuberi 2010).   
Several years later in 1992 attorneys for the Legal Aid Society of Minneapolis 
filed a suit against the Minneapolis Public Housing Authority, HUD, and the city under 
allegations that they discriminated in the siting of public housing.  Legal aid provided 
evidence that housing projects were concentrated near the traditional center of the 
African-American community in the city.   The settlement of the lawsuit, the consent 
decree in Hollman v. Cisneros, similar to Gautreaux became an effort to deconcentrate 
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poverty, facilitate greater geographic spread of assisted units and assisted families, and 
reduce the number of public housing units on that site (Goetz 2003: 12).   
Gautreuax and Hollaman v. Cisneros were early efforts to deconcentrate poverty 
and involved dispersing minority and low-income concentrations.  They also reflected the 
notion of mobility and resident choice.  As policy makers began to question the success 
of such efforts Moving to Opportunity (MTO) was designed in order to assess 
deconcentration outcomes.  
Moving to Opportunity  
Congress enacted MTO in 1982 after policy makers deemed Gautreaux a success, 
with the intention of answering: 
 Can federal housing programs effectively promote the dispersal of low-income 
families? 
 What short- and long-term effects does re-location have on the lives of those who 
volunteer to participate? 
 Is it possible for MTO to become a permanent federal effort to disperse families 
across the US? (as qtd Stal and Zuberi 2010: 6). 
Policy makers have rationalized Moving to Opportunity, like other programs intended 
to deconcentrate poverty, as an opportunity for individuals to have access to 
neighborhoods that would enhance employment and educational opportunities and at the 
same time decrease exposure to violence, crime, and drugs (Clark 2008).   
From 1994 to 1997 HUD recruited families from five urban PHAs: New York, 
Chicago, Los Angeles, Baltimore, and Boston to participate in MTO (Curley 2005; Gay 
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2011; Quigley et al. 2008; Stal and Zuberi 2010).  In each city an experimental group was 
provided with section 8 subsidies accompanied with moving assistance and mobility 
counseling, and were restricted to use the vouchers in neighborhoods in census tracts with 
poverty rates below 10% (Curly 2011; Quigley et al. 2010; Stal and Zuberi 2010).  The 
treatment group received no mobility assistance, and the control remained in their current 
public housing (Curly 2010; Quigley et al. 2010, Stal and Zuberi 2010). 
The results appeared promising 18 months after the initial move.  The 
experimental group moved to more advantageous neighborhoods, exhibited improved 
mental and physical health, experienced less criminal victimization, and there were fewer 
incidences of behavioral problems for girls (Clark 2008; Stal and Zuberi 2010).  At the 
time of the interim report, 4 to 7 years later, the positive effects of MTO had faded (Clark 
2008; Stal and Zuberi 2010).  This decline occurred as individuals made additional 
location choices (Stal and Zuberi 2010).  Furthermore some families reported that life in 
their new neighborhoods was difficult and they felt socially isolated; some of them 
returned to their original neighborhoods (Stal and Zuberi 2010).  Overall there was no 
evidence that there was impact on individual self-sufficiency (Quigley et al. 2010). 
When movers and non-movers are aggregated a difference does not exist between 
current MTO and current section 8 locations (Clark 2008).  There were gains for 
individual people but not necessarily from the program.  These changes could be 
attributed to the structural advantages of suburban areas such as school, public services, 
and job accessibility (Clark 2008).  Since the 1980s over 66% of employment growth has 
occurred outside the central city (Wilson 2008).  Furthermore, the city is a dynamic place 
and many residents that did not receive vouchers were still able to improve their housing 
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situation (Clark 2008).  Similarly Jacob (2004) found that students affected by demolition 
were significantly less likely to be living in public housing three years after a closure 
announcement.  Clark (2008) suggests that because people move frequently, the 
counseling required with the initial voucher is limited in its scope.  
Besides, Clark (2008) asserted that when aggregated, MTO is no more effective 
than the natural dynamics of the city.   Gay (2011: 148) found that MTO has 
unintentionally impacted voter turnout among participants:  
But residential mobility also has the potential to disrupt and perhaps, transform—
for better or for worse—the political lives of poor Americans.  By imposing new 
administrative burdens (e.g., the need to change voter registration), while at the 
same time exposing participants to new social environments and networks, the 
MTO experimental intervention, unintentionally, manipulated both the costs and 
incentives to electoral participation, with unknown consequences for the behavior 
of the targeted adults   
MTO has the potential to disrupt many aspects of life for participants including voter 
participation and social networks, and there is evidence that there are several limits to the 
scope of the program. 
Deconcentration Outcomes 
Kingsley, Johnson, and Pettit (2003) found that there does not tend to be very 
much deconcentration spatially.  Residents from severely distressed neighborhoods tend 
to relocate into neighborhoods not too far from their original residence.  Across all cities 
the median distance moved was 2.9 miles.  However, they did find that the average 
poverty rate of neighborhoods of residence dropped 34%.   And, while the largest share 
of individuals remained in neighborhoods with minority rates above 90%, the percentage 
living in high minority neighborhoods decreased from 71% in minority neighborhoods to 
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41%.  Overall 68% of HOPE VI relocatees using Section 8 lived in tracts with less than 
five other relocatees. In some cities, such as Lexington, KY and Louisville, KY there is a 
higher concentration of relocatees.  In Louisville, 55% of relocatees live in tracts with 
15% or more shares of Section 8 households (p. 433, 436, 439). 
The original language of the HOPE VI grant required winners to heed the 
economic and social needs of residents in addition to the physical condition of housing.   
A part of promoting self-sufficiency is about improving the life circumstances of public 
housing residents.  Forty-one percent of those that relocated with housing vouchers stated 
that their overall financial situations had improved (Brooks et. all 2005).  Many public 
housing residents leave their homes under the impression that they will be able to return.  
However, there are strict eligibility requirements that must be met in order to return to the 
development after it is complete.  The criteria include: employment requirements, 
criminal and drug test, no late rent payments in the past year, and no lease violations in 
the past three years (Tach 2009; Hanlon 2010).  There are eligibility requirements for 
voucher recipients as well, although they are less stringent (Hanlon 2010).  As a part of 
HOPE VI redevelopments some residents get displaced.  In Louisville, KY during the 
revitalization of Cotter and Lang Homes 400 residents relocated without assistance and 
there is no information about what happened to them (Hanlon 2010). 
Critics say that relocation tends to leave residents worse off, in particular they are 
sent to locations that are little better than the distressed housing projects (Buron, Levy, 
and Gallagher 2007).  Residents that relocate using housing vouchers to subsidize private 
market housing face several challenges, including paying utilities, dealing with landlords, 
and tenant screening (Buron, Levy, and Gallagher 2007).  The biggest concern for 
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residents that relocated via housing vouchers tended to surround paying utilities (Brooks 
et. all 2005). 
A study of HOPE VI individuals that relocated with section 8 vouchers showed 
they had not experienced significant improvements in economic self-sufficiency after two 
years (Boston 2005).  Boston (2005) also found that poor households that moved from 
conventional public housing experienced significant improvements in socio-economic 
status and neighborhood quality.  The finding led him to conclude that mixed income 
revitalization and residential mobility has the potential to have positive outcome if it is 
administered properly. 
Deconcentration has produced less than convincing results.  Jacob (2004) found 
that demolition had a small negative effect on educational attainment of older children in 
public housing and among younger children public housing had no statistically 
significant impact on student achievement.  Jacob (2004) also found that families tend to 
relocate to neighborhoods relatively close to their original residence; three years after 
closure notification treatment and comparison students appear to be attending schools 
that are identical in terms of peer achievement, and there was a modest decline in 
poverty—with a shift from extremely high poverty tracts to simply high poverty tracts.  
Goetz (2005) supported this, saying that individuals may move to neighborhoods that are 
less distressed than their original residence, but the neighborhoods tend to be more 
distressed than average.   
Researchers have long questioned whether broadly defined economic 
development programs improve well-being (Loboa et al. 2012).  In a study of job creation 
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Bartik cautioned against offering individual incentives because they are costly and attract 
low paying jobs (Loboa et al. 2010).  Using this same logic Clark (2008) questioned 
whether the poor benefit or if there is an aggregated societal gain.  In other words are the 
results of MTO worth the expenditure? Clark (2008) found that MTO movers were more 
likely to be in lower-poverty areas than Section 8 leasers, but concludes that MTO as a 
program doesn’t fare better than regular section 8 vouchers as a program.   
Barriers to Deconcentrating Poverty 
All of these deconcentration efforts face the same obstacle: enlisting suburban 
neighborhoods.  In order to truly deconcentrate poverty cities must enlist suburban 
neighborhoods to take on housing poor as well, and in many cases this has not occurred.  
Suburbs have the power the resist social forces that would integrate the poor (Salins 1993, 
Goetz 2003).  “The neighborhoods that can provide the most benefits to the poor are off 
limits either because they won’t accept affordable replacement units or the market won’t 
allow them to use vouchers” (Goetz 2005: 409).  It is important to understand that the 
suburban way of life was created in opposition to the hectic, immoral, unstable, and 
dangerous lifestyle associated with urban neighborhoods (Murphy 2007).  There have 
long been concerns that deconcentrating poverty would cause suburban crime to rise, but 
Lens (2013) found that there was no relationship between housing vouchers and crime.  
So while those concerns may be unwarranted it is logical for suburbanites to resist an 
influx of urban poor particularly poor that are depicted as all of the ills associated with 
the city.   
In addition to the desired results a consequence of deconcentration connects the 
city to the periphery.  The importance of connecting issues of central city revitalization 
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with growth in suburban areas is becoming more widely recognized (Wiewel and 
Schaffer 2001).  The grand regional strategy of “New Urbanism was to rebalance the city 
and the suburbs by bringing more middle class families back to the city while creating 
more opportunity for affordable housing in the suburbs” (Calthrope 2009: 52).  This 
strategy is reflective of a turn toward dealing with issues on a regional basis.  It is 
important to connect the city redevelopment to suburban areas because there is typically 
opposition to development of low income housing in suburbs.  Furthermore, city leaders 
are beginning to subscribe to the sentiment that the city must wait for the suburbs to take 
on its share of low cost housing development (Goetz 2000).  Crump also recognizes the 
connection between central city revitalization and suburbs.  The low-income people 
displaced by the development can potentially be relocated to the suburbs and supply low 
wage labor that is in short supply (Crump 2002). 
 The concerns of suburbanites become particularly salient when one considers the 
coinciding changes that have occurred in cities and suburbs.  The suburbs have 
experienced a significant increase in poverty rates since the 1990s.  Suburban poverty 
continues to rise at a rate greater than that of central cities and amelioration of inner-city 
poverty has coincided with the deterioration of inner-ring suburbs1.  This rise in suburban 
poverty should not just be an issue for concerned residents, but it also important to 
scholars of urban poverty.  If the trends of current deconcentration efforts continue ( ie., 
residents moving to neighborhoods less distressed than original but more so than average) 
it is likely that residents that relocate could end up in poor suburban neighborhoods.  
                                                        
1 Madden (2003) provides contradictory evidence about the growth of suburban poverty.  According to 
Madden (2003) there is evidence that poverty has become slight more concentrated among suburbs over the 
past 20 years, however large and older central cities in the Northeast and Midwest regions have 
experienced a greater increase in poverty relative to the current rates of poverty in surrounding suburbs, and 
large central cities in the South and West have higher rates relative to their surrounding suburbs  
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Suburban neighborhoods are less well equipped to serve low-income residents—services 
are often dispersed and the healthcare infrastructure is inadequate.  The low birthrates 
typically found in the suburbs have been attributed to the challenges women have in 
accessing prenatal care in poor suburban neighborhoods.  The rise in non-English 
speaking populations also poses a challenge for social service providers in the suburbs 
(Murphy 2007).2 
 In discussing the role of suburbs in deconcentration one must also consider that 
there are fewer social service providers than in cities with comparable poverty rates 
(Murphy 2007). Murphy (2007) demonstrated the disparity in service providers, stating 
that in Washington, DC residents in a high poverty census tract would have 5 job training 
centers and 5 food providers in close proximity whereas residents in suburban 
neighborhoods with comparable poverty would not be spatially proximate to one of either 
type of provider.  Proximity to services is critical to usage, therefore being a long 
distance from services is equivalent to being denied (Murphy 2007).  This may be due to 
the fact that a large proportion of low-income people rely of public transportation.  For 
example, in the inner city of Chicago only 19% of residents have access to an automobile 
(Wilson 2008), therefore the availability of public transportation is another important 
matter when considering deconcentrating poverty.   There has been increasing interest in 
addressing problems regionally, and several cities have begun to focus on concerns about 
the decline of the central city and suburban sprawl simultaneously (Wiewel and Schaffer 
                                                        
2 Murphy (2007) notes that adequate social service provision is linked to population density.  It is easier 
and more efficient for social service provides to deliver services in areas where the population is more 
concentrated.  This inherently contradicts the goal of deconcentration, and ultimately suggests that 
deconcentration may be counterproductive if the goal is to truly improve the well-being of the poor.   
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2001)3.  Deconcentration efforts make this approach essential because deconcentration of 
poverty is just as much a concern for the suburbs as the central city. 
Gentrification 
Ruth Glass (1964) coined the term “gentrification” to describe the displacement 
of working class residents in London by middle class individual, and according to Smith 
(1979) gentrification is the result of a series of private and public investment decisions.  
In more contemporary literature Essoka (2010) defines gentrification as “The nexus 
between private capital investments in urban residential properties with an influx of 
households having higher socioeconomic status than current residents” (p. 304). In 
attempting to promote mixed income communities HOPE VI has the potential to spur 
gentrification or as some scholar observed gentrifying neighborhoods have been targeted 
from HOPE VI developments.   
A fundamental element of gentrification is depreciation.  According to Smith 
(1970) it is necessary in order for gentrification to be a rational market response.  The 
process of depreciation can involve under-maintenance of properties by landlords, block 
busting and blow out, red lining, and the abandonment of properties.  It is important to 
note that the state can play an important role in this process (Smith 1979).  We know that 
the federal government played a substantial role in the deterioration of the inner city 
because of the disinvestment in public housing, and the government has also aided 
reinvestment by leveraging private investors through HOPE VI.   
                                                        
3 Society has been traditionally dichotomized as rural and urban but this leaves out suburbs and according 
to Wang et al. (2012) the rural-urban dichotomy masks the complexity and diversity of rural and urban 
policies.  This is concerning for mixed rural/urban areas because a places classification influences the type 
funds it is eligible to receive (Wang et al. 2012). 
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Demolition may benefit cities by improving the appearance of concentrated 
poverty neighborhoods, and by reducing poverty rates, crime, and attendant social ills, 
but the studies discussed here do not show strong evidence that demolition has been 
beneficial for the poor.  Deconcentration and demolition merely mask a larger, structural 
problem.  It is a superficial fix, akin to sweeping the dirt under a rug.  Keene and 
Geronimus (2011) critique HOPE VI as a “spatial remedy” which does not address 
structural issues seeing as most relocated residents end up in neighborhoods that are at 
best marginally better than their original location.  If rental or subsidized housing no 
longer bares the stigmatized packaging of public housing then it can be erased from the 
consciousness of the public.  For that very reason demolition is suspected of being a 
poorly veiled excuse for gentrification.   
Opponents to demolition have posed questions about the true intent of the policy.  
One opponent questions, “Is it a wise strategy for reducing the residential segregation or 
is it a convenient way to get these people off that property” (Goetz 2003:155)?  Another 
individual faced with demolition because of the Hollaman decree asks, “Why do we find 
ourselves in the middle of all this? Because we were living on strategically important 
land, land that other people wanted to take from us” (as qtd Goetz 2003:162).  Since the 
benefits of HOPE VI are mostly place-based (ie., reclaiming particular neighborhoods, 
reducing criminal activity, and upgrading the physical environment) and in many areas 
has spawned or facilitated gentrification (Goetz 2005) it is important to examine the 
motive of local governments and PHAs  and to investigate development for evidence of 
gentrification.   
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Over time residential pressures and increasing housing demands have once again 
made the inner city viable as a residential alternative (Essoka 2010).  Even though these 
areas lack structural and economic infrastructure there is desirable architecture (Essoka 
2010).  Furthermore, programs such as HOPE VI go a long way to rebuild infrastructure.  
One of the goals of HOPE VI is to leverage private capital, and the grant application even 
favors developments that may achieve spillover effects.  Both the GOA and HUD Office 
Inspector General found that HOPE VI began focusing on smaller projects with the 
greater potential to attract private investors as opposed to the most severely distressed 
locations (Duryea 2006; Harvard Law Review 2003).  The capacity for profit in 
gentrifying neighborhoods is attractive to private investors.  Furthermore, some PHAs 
have recognized the real estate value of the land on which housing projects sit.  The 
Boston Housing Authority went from describing the Clippership housing development as 
a “jewel” of public housing to severely distressed in two years.  “According to the 
residents, Clippership did not suddenly become ‘severely distressed.’ Rather, East 
Boston's real estate boom prompted the BHA to realize that the real ‘jewel’ of 
Clippership was not its tight-knit and safe community, but rather the land under the 
townhouses, with its spectacular harbor views” (Harvard Law Review 2003: 1494).  
Based on anecdotal evidence and the actions of some PHAs it is only logical to suspect 
that HOPE VI has spurred gentrification.    
HOPE VI in Louisville 
In 1996 Housing Authority of Louisville received a $20 million grant to redevelop 
on the former site of Cotter Homes, Lang Homes, and Algonqin Square.  In 1953 
Housing Authority of Louisville opened Cotter and Lang Homes (Raffel et al. 2003).  By  
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1986 the intersection where the two housing projects met had gained the reputation as 
being “the meanest corner in town” (Hanlon 2010: 85, Raffel et al. 2003).  In the HOPE 
VI application Housing Authority of Louisville cited Cotter and Lang Homes as plagued 
with high poverty and the highest violent crime rate in the city of Louisville (Raffel et al. 
2003). 
The project ultimately cost $237; million the difference between the grant and the 
cost was made up through a combination of private and local funding as well as funds 
from HUD under a different program (Hanlon 2010).  Today Park Duvalle consists of 
1100 housing units 613 of which are rental units, another 363 are subsidized units, and 
the remaining 450 units are private homes (Hanlon 2010, Raffel et al. 2003).  The median 
sale price of market rate homes was $142, 242 as of 2002, and as late as 2008 the prices 
were ranging from $105,000 to $300,000 (Hanlon 2010).   As of 2010 the median value 
of owner occupied units was $121,000 (U.S. Census Bureau). 
Between 1990 and 2000 the poverty rate from the census tract in which Park 
Duvalle is located fell from 78.3% to 28.1% (Hanlon 2010).  Unemployment also 
decreased from 34.6% to 7.1%, which was marginally below the city-wide 
unemployment rate (Hanlon 2010).  As of 2010 the percentage unemployed in census 
tract 14, where Park Duvalle is located, was 8% (U.S. Census).  In 1994 Cotter and Lang 
Homes had a crime rate that was 137% above the city average (Engdahl 2009b).  The 
number of crimes decreased from 530 in 1994 to 13 in 2002 (Raffel et al. 2003).  In terms 
of the quality of life Brazley and Gilderbloom (2007) concluded that only a small 
percentage of residents benefited.    They note that for the 27% that temporarily relocated 
to other public housing, there was not improvement and there is no data about the quality 
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of life of the 23% that were evicted.  Park Duvalle like many other former public housing 
sites had been reimaged as a safe place to live.  As the problems such as crime and 
violence were ameliorated, developers were able to market Park Duvalle as a place for 
African Americans who grew up in the West End to “return to their roots.” (Raffel et al. 
2003: 104).   
 Liberty Green, the subject of this study, was rebuilt over Clarksdale, which was 
65 years old at the time of demolition and had 713 units (Downs 2012; Louisvilleky.gov 
2006).  The population of Clarksdale was 97% African American and 87% were female 
heads of household (Stone 2011:7).  Much like Park DuValle, media accounts described 
Liberty Green as being troubled by poverty and crime such as drugs and prostitution.  By 
the end of 2007 approximately 41% of all former residents resided in other public 
housing developments, 12% at scattered sites, 26.5% used housing vouchers, and 1.5% 
lived in Liberty Green (Stone 2011: 42). 
New construction for this project began in 2005, and the project has a price tag of 
$233 million dollars (Louisvilleky.gov 2006).  The units for sale range in price from 
$100,000 to $430,000, and the first owner occupied home was sold for $580,000 in early 
2012 (Downs 2012).  Lessons from Park Duvalle informed the implementation at Liberty 
Green.  Based on complaints about the lack of social services LMHA initiated 
Community Support Services (CSS), which was designed to reflect the needs and goals 
of Clarksdale residents (Stone 2011).  Programming included: tutoring/mentoring, youth 
programming, GED training, computer classes, vocational training, homeownership 
counseling, and assistance obtaining medical and construction jobs (Stone 2011).  In 
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addition a new concept middle school, Nativity School, was built in conjunction with 
Archdiocese of Louisville and St. Boniface Parish (Stone 2011). 
In her program evaluation Stone (2011) found that a significant proportion of 
residents improved their level of education and there was a lower proportion of residents 
with below poverty incomes at follow up interviews after the rehabilitation.  Stone 
concludes that this, among other factors, suggests that Clarksdale residents are in a better 
position to get or maintain a job.  Stauffer (n.d) is critical of Stone’s evaluation.  
According to Stauffer (n.d) Stone did not sufficiently use qualitative data nor adequately 
use the data that was available and therefore one cannot sufficiently assess whether CSS 
was a causal factor in resident outcomes. 
Conclusion 
 The attention directed at the poor is not necessarily in their best interest.  As I 
mentioned earlier, many people remain concerned with urban poverty because cities 
remain the heart of metropolitan areas.  Poverty does not make a pretty picture.  
Deteriorating housing projects are not part of the image that local officials want tourists 
or potential business investors to see when considering their city.  Poverty and the poor 
are a stain that must be washed away.  Similar to the way Mayor Giuliani hid the 
homeless in New York (Bumiller 1999).  The policies implemented indicate that policy 
makers have rarely been concerned with actually eradicating poverty.  Instead of policies 
that deal with underemployment and unemployment we see policies that do little more 
than sanitize cities by demolishing housing projects across the nation.  There are many 
stakeholders involved in a HOPE VI development and changing the face of public 
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housing has multiple objectives, which impact both communities and the people who live 
there.   The history of federal policy dealing with public housing indicates that the goals 
of HOPE VI may be in conflict and that improving the image of cities is primary and 
improving the lives of the people who live there is secondary. 
There appears to be promising policy development on the horizon.  HOPE VI 
sites are still being developed, but urban poverty policy is once again experiencing 
change.  HUD designed the Choice Neighborhood Program to replace HOPE VI in 2010.  
This program has been described as being more comprehensive than just rehabilitation 
and includes components ranging from Early Childhood Education, employment, safety, 
and transportation.  A similar program, Harlem Children’s Zone (HCZ), was developed 
with the mission to flood a number of blocks in Harlem with social services ranging from 
educational to medical services in order to create a safe environment for children in the 
area.  There is anecdotal evidence that HCZ has been a success.  For six years in a row 
100% of students from the program’s Head Start are school ready and elementary school 
students are closing the black-white achievement gap in math and Language arts (Wilson 
2010: 44).  This policy unlike previous policy appears to be dealing with some of the 






There is a large body of literature covering HOPE VI, but there are few studies 
that question the role of gentrification in the selecting of HOPE VI sites. Recall that 
gentrification is “the nexus between private capital investments in urban residential 
properties with an influx of households having higher socioeconomic status than current 
residents (Essoka 2010:304), that cities are suspected of favoring gentrification, and that 
Goetz (2011) found that pressure for gentrification was a strong predictor of HOPE VI 
development in the 1990s. I use an in-depth case study to examine how well the goals of 
local officials align with the stated goals of HOPE VI.  I ask the following questions: 
 How did the Louisville Public Housing Authority select the site to apply for a 
grant? 
 Was the process for selecting the Liberty Green site different than when Park 
DuValle was selected? 
 To date, has Liberty Green achieve the stated goals of HOPE VI developments? 
These questions were designed to assess the city’s motives in regards to the development 
of Liberty Green, and to determine which goals were met with the demolition of 
Clarksdale. 
Liberty Green is a prime case to investigate because of the changing housing 
market in downtown Louisville, and the presence of a previous HOPE VI development 
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(Park DuValle in 1996) allows for comparison of the Housing Authority’s rationale in 
choosing which housing project to apply for the HOPE VI grant in 2002.   
The implementation of a HOPE VI development requires input from several 
actors.  According to Faegin, Orum, and Sjoberg (1991) a good case study can provide a 
full sense of actors’ motives that result in specific decisions.  Furthermore, case studies 
are useful for investigating the decisions of organizational elites (Sjoberg et al. 1991).  
Employing a case study can expose the full complexity of the decision making process of 
selecting a HOPE VI site.  Because of the multiple methods utilized in case studies, one 
is able to gain an in-depth picture of a particular phenomenon (Marshall and Rossman 
1999). 
Using interviews, content analysis, observations, and census data this study 
investigates the objectives of local officials and how well they align with the following 
objectives of HOPE VI as stated by HUD:   
 Changing the physical shape of public housing 
 Lessening the concentrations of poverty by placing public housing in non-
poverty neighborhoods and promoting mixed income communities 
 Establishing positive incentive for self-sufficiency and comprehensive 
services that empower residents 
 Forging partnerships with other agencies, local governments, non-profit 
organizations, and private businesses to leverage support and resources. 
(HUD.gov 2012). 
 Interviews for this study were conducted with a selection of local stakeholders 
and government officials.   Elite interviews are useful for providing insight on policies, 
past histories, and future plans (Marshall and Rossman 1999).   I structured the interview 
guides to elicit information about the goals of local officials and policy makers (see 
Appendices A and B).   
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The elite interviews were conducted with individuals that were influential in the 
Liberty Green Development.  Preliminary research revealed the names of 11 individuals 
involved in the early stages of planning and implementation of the project.  Snowball 
sampling was utilized to identify other individuals not included in the original sample and 
produced one additional participant for this study.  Because interviews with three persons 
were not secured, a total of nine interviews were conducted.  Three individuals were 
affiliated with the Louisville Metro Housing Authority during the planning process for 
Liberty Green.  Four participants were affiliated with the city of Louisville, one 
participant was affiliated with the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and 
one participant was affiliated with a local non-profit focused on fair and affordable 
housing in Kentucky.  
In addition to interviews, this study employed content analysis to investigate the 
goals of local officials.  Content analysis is an unobtrusive and non-reactive research 
technique that can portray the values and beliefs of participants (Marshall and Rossman 
1999).   A search for all content on Liberty Green and Clarksdale in Louisville Business 
First was carried out.  The earliest article published in Louisville Business First 
discussing the potential for demolishing Clarksdale was written in 2001 and coverage 
extended until 2013.  An open records request for all city council meetings during which 
Liberty Green or Clarksdale were discussed was performed; but based on the quality of 
information from city council members and complications accessing the records, this 
component was excluded from the study.  Content analysis was also performed on the 
grant application for Liberty Green.  Interviews and document analysis were coded and 
analyzed according to grounded theory techniques (Charmaz 2006).  Initial coding was 
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guided by the literature.  During the focused coding two major themes emerged: 
community/neighborhood development and residential impact.  The category of 
neighborhood development includes the designation as mixed income, downtown 
development, the location decision, and physical transformation.  Residential impact 
includes the goal of self-sufficiency, perceived benefits for residents, public housing’s 
population, and displacement. 
Observations at Liberty Green were carried out in order to assess how well the 
development has achieved the goal of “changing the physical shape of public housing” 
and “promoting mixed income communities.”  Observations consisted of a block-by-
block description of Liberty Green including a count of property types and physical 
descriptions of the buildings.   
  The final component of this study employed quantitative data to address how 
well this development has achieved the goals of HOPE VI.  Liberty Green is located in 
census tract number 59, which encompasses both the Phoenix Hill and Butchertown 
neighborhoods, two neighborhoods which have undergone major changes in the recent 
past.  The census tract, represented by red in figure 1 is bordered by I-64 in the north, I-
65 to the west, E. Broadway to the south, and South Fork Bluegrass Creek to the east. 
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Figure 1. Map of Census Tract 59 
Source: US Census Bureau 
The tract-level census data was used to compare race, income, educational 
attainment, employment status, female-headed households, and poverty level before the 
construction of Liberty Green, represented by 2000 census data, and after the 
construction of Liberty Green, represented by the 2010 five-year estimates of the 
American Community Survey.   
Crime rate data from Louisville Metro Police was utilized to track the changes in 
crime before and after the development of Liberty Green.  An open records request for 
the total number of crimes committed each year between 2003 and 2010 in the city 
Louisville and in each of the police divisions where a public housing development was 
located.  This includes Clarksdale (Division 1, Beat 5), Iroquois (Division 4, beat 5) 
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Parkway Place (Division 2, Beat 5), Beecher Terrace (Division 1, Beat 3), and Sheppard 
Square (Division 4, beat 2). 
This study also assessed whether the revitalization of Clarksdale had an impact on 
commercial development.  Before a business opens in Louisville it must be registered 
with the Louisville Metro Revenue Commission before earning income.  A search of new 
accounts opened with the Louisville Metro Revenue Commission between 2003 and 2012 
was conducted. Results of the search were filtered to accounts registered with addresses 
in the 40202 zip code, wherein Clarksdale was located.   Although this zip code extends 





Liberty Green in Louisville, KY sits in the midst of downtown industry, retail 
shops, and a burgeoning residential development. It is surrounded by the medical center 
to the south and the trendy NULU neighborhood to the north.  The area surrounding 
Liberty Green has undergone some major changes over the course of the past few 
decades. Clarksdale, the original version of the neighborhood, was once a development 
isolated from the neighboring community whereas Liberty Green, its successor, has been 
integrated into the community.  Officials worked to incorporate Liberty Green as a solid 
component of the community; for instance, Louisville Metro Housing Authority and the 
University of Louisville partnered together to include student housing for medical school 
students in the area. Additionally, NULU Edge Food Market, which opened the summer 
of 2013, communicates that Liberty Green is in fact a part of the surrounding community.  
The changes that have accompanied the development of Liberty Green reflect the 
ideological change that spurred the HOPE VI program and that has guided federal public 
housing policy. 
One of the concerns with HOPE VI developments is that they have the potential 
to spur gentrification.  Even more importantly, because gentrification was a leading 
predictor of the selection of HOPE VI sites in the 1990s, according to Goetz (2011), it is 
important to assess which goals HOPE VI developments actually meet. In answering how
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do the goals of local officials align with the stated goals of HOPE VI, this study revealed 
that it is not necessarily the goals of the major players involved in a HOPE VI program 
that are in conflict with one another but the goals of the HOPE VI program itself that are 
at times contradictory.   
HUD (2012) states that the goals of HOPE VI are: 
 Changing the physical shape of public housing 
 Lessening the concentrations of poverty by placing public housing in non-
poverty neighborhoods and promoting mixed income communities 
 Establishing positive incentive for self-sufficiency and comprehensive 
services that empower residents 
 Forging partnerships with other agencies, local governments, non-profit 
organizations, and private businesses to leverage support and resources. 
Evidence from this study suggests that the goals of changing the physical shape of public 
housing and lessening the concentrations of poverty can be collapsed into one goal—
neighborhood development.  Neighborhood development, and in turn HOPE VI 
developments, impacts multiple layers of communities, from physical infrastructure to 
services.  Demolition has been the method selected in order to meet the goal of 
neighborhood development, and this process is disruptive to the lives of the residents 
served by public housing.    
The HOPE VI program is intended to have some impact on residents’ lives, which 
is reflected by the goal of self-sufficiency. Activities aimed at promoting self-sufficiency, 
such as job training or educational opportunities, are intended to help individuals 
transition off of public assistance.  But the ultimate goal of the HOPE VI program is to 
change the physical shape of public housing.  There is a delicate balancing act when it 
comes to demolishing public housing through the HOPE VI program.  When asked about 
 43 
the goals of HOPE VI, 7 out of 9 participants referred to some form of neighborhood 
development benefit as part of the overall plan.  At the same time, respondents and the 
grant applicants expressed concerns that the redevelopment of a site might negatively 
impact the lives of those who live there.  
According to a local representative from HUD, the HOPE VI program had “a 
statutory goal to tear down a specific number of public housing units.”  In meeting this 
goal and demolishing public housing there is a potential for residents to be displaced or 
affected negatively in other ways.  In reviewing the data, neighborhood development 
goals and the impact on residents are in constant tension during the implementation of 
HOPE VI. 
Neighborhood Development 
Neighborhood development is a large portion of the HOPE VI program.  In the 
executive summary of the grant application presented to HUD, the Housing Authority of 
Louisville states, “The goal of the Clarksdale Plan is to utilize its location as an asset and 
develop a community with a vastly heightened livability for its residents and its 
neighborhoods” (Housing Authority of Louisville 2002).  Here, LMHA makes it clear 
that neighborhood development is key.  First and foremost, we see that the goal of the 
revitalization is about community development; residents are secondary.  Since residents 
are a secondary concern, it is important to ask whom this new community benefits.  
In discussing the need for revitalization at Clarksdale, the grant narrative reveals 
that the negative impact on the surrounding community plays just as important a role as 
the amount of physical distress at the site.  According to the authors of the grant 
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application (2002), Clarksdale had numerous structural and social problems that 
negatively impacted living conditions including mold, lead, a failing boiler system, 
ponding water, asbestos, trash, rodents, a deteriorated sewer system, and high crime.  In 
fact, the grant application stated that there were 180 major offenses in 2000 and that the 
crime in Clarksdale was almost 4 times the rate of the city as a whole (HAL 2002).  In 
2003, a year before work started on Liberty Green, crime at Clarksdale accounted for 
8.43% of all crime in the city of Louisville (see Table 1).  However, it was not the public 
housing development with the most crime.  In 2003 Beecher Terrace accounted for 
12.38% of crime in Louisville and Sheppard Square accounted for 18.13%.  If the crime 
rates were the major factor for redevelopment criteria, then it stands to reason that 
Sheppard Square should have been selected as a candidate for a HOPE VI before 
Clarksdale instead of after. The crime rate is a secondary criterion and it is viewed in 
relation to neighborhood development.  Crime and the perception of high crime are 












Table 1: Comparison of Crime in Neighborhoods With Public Housing 
Crime Rates 
 Louisville Clarksdale  Parkway Place  Beecher Terrace  Iroquois  Sheppard Square 
Year  Count % Count % Count % Count % Count % 
2003 6912 583 8.43% 484 7.00% 856 12.38% 451 6.52% 1253 18.13% 
2004 29,462 1118 3.79% 905 3.07% 1744 5.92% 923 3.13% 2670 9.06% 
2005 31,342 1133 3.61% 1087 3.47% 1881 6.00% 1121 3.58% 2927 9.34% 
2006 32,972 1076 3.26% 1113 3.38% 1975 5.99% 1428 4.33% 3110 9.43% 
2007 33,781 1214 3.59% 1157 3.43% 2308 6.83% 1283 3.80% 3421 10.13% 
2008 33,726 1088 3.23% 1083 3.21% 2237 6.63% 1412 4.19% 3198 9.48% 
2009 30,676 1057 3.45% 1114 3.63% 2108 6.87% 1331 4.34% 3161 10.30% 
2010 33,285 1049 3.15% 1017 3.06% 2344 7.04% 1402 4.21% 3259 9.79% 
Source: Louisville Metro Police Department 
Notes: 1Only 3 months reported for the calendar year 2003. 2Because of changes in reporting practices, 2005 figures are not 





In spite of Clarksdale’s poor condition, physical distress was not the determining 
factor in selecting it for revitalization.  Several participants acknowledged that Parkway 
Place was in much worse condition and in fact was under consideration at one point.  
When asked how a housing authority chooses which site to apply for a grant, a 
respondent who worked on the grant application stated: 
Well I think it’s a combination of factors, definitely one is the physical distress of 
the site.  That’s a huge piece of the application, and you have to go through and 
have an architect certify to the issues of the site.  So for Louisville, Clarksdale had 
a lot of physical issues: infrastructure, building issues, mold problems, 
accessibility issues.  I think for Louisville it was Parkway and Liberty Green, 
excuse me, Clarksdale and Parkway were both under consideration at that time… 
I think that Parkway has been kind of, “which way do you go with Parkway?”  Do 
you continue to have housing over there or should that really be more industrial? 
Similarly, a representative from the city of Louisville offered:  
The public housing unit that should come down before any and all of any of the 
ones that we took down is the one out on Hill Street but it didn’t meet the 
standard because you would never want to rebuild there because it’s an industrial 
area.  Are you with me? Park Hill is the one in my judgment that needed to come 
down before any of these.  Cotter and Lang was dang close to being in that bad of 
shape, but the one on Hill is the toughest.   
 
For the grant applicantion and city official alike, Parkway Place was just as a good a 
candidate, if not better, for HOPE VI based on physical distress.  In spite of the poor 
condition of Parkway, Clarksdale was the site that was selected.  The statement from the 
city official highlights that the major difference between Parkway and Clarksdale was 
location.  Clarksdale was surrounded by a burgeoning downtown, whereas Parkway is 
surrounded by an industrial area.  From these comments we can see that location is a key 





A housing advocate also noted the importance of location: 
I do not consider these about the people who live there; nobody who lived there 
comes back. Really, seriously and if you wanted the worst of the worsts you 
would have started with Parkway.  They didn’t want the worst of the worst they 
wanted the ones where the real estate had potential value.  
 
This participant offers a more critical observation.  Because of Clarksdale’s location, 
demolition had the potential to increase property values in the surrounding area.  As each 
of these participants noted, Parkway was in poorer condition than Clarksdale and yet it 
was not selected because physical distress is not enough to win a HOPE VI grant.  All of 
these participants recognized that there was a site that was physically worse off than 
Clarksdale.  The major differences between Parkway and Clarksdale were location and 
the potential for real estate value.  
Location played a significant part in which development was chosen for 
revitalization.  All of the physical distress problems associated with Clarksdale were 
considered in relation to the surrounding neighborhood, particularly the downtown and 
east corridor development at the time.  According to the grant application, there had been 
an “urban renaissance” in these areas and there had been concerted efforts to revitalize 
downtown outlined by the Downtown Development Plan.  The application cited the 
development at Waterfront Park and a $15,200,000 pool of financing organized by the 
mayor to spur the development of market rate housing downtown as clear evidence of the 
revitalization efforts. 
Clarksdale displayed visible signs of disinvestment and decline such as boarded 
up buildings, abandoned businesses, and vacant lots (Housing Authority of Louisville 




neighborhood less attractive to businesses; in addition, property values stagnated and, in 
some cases, declined.  An essential feature of neighborhood development is the ability to 
make an impact beyond the revitalization.  The grant narrative emphasized Clarksdale’s 
potential impact on the surrounding community, which reflects HUD’s desire for a HOPE 
VI to have potential for “spillover.”  Furthermore, several respondents discussed the 
development in context of what else was occurring nearby.  A participant affiliated with 
LMHA stated:  
Well you’ve got other things going on around it that were already there.  You’ve 
got the whole Market Street corridor with restaurants, which is very attractive.  
 
Similarly a participant involved in the project through the city stated: 
From a planning perspective we always thought that the impact of Liberty Green 
would be a spillover effect.  That you would see this sort of residential corridor 
paralleling the interstate and linking Shelby Park to Waterfront Park.  That you 
would just have this whole corridor of housing, not solid housing, but a mixture of 
housing happening in that linear space…we were hoping if Liberty Green was 
going to be 700 units that we would see about 3x that, about 2,000, in housing 
units, new in that area.  
These participants recognized the residential and commercial potential of Clarksdale.  
Because of Clarksdale’s location downtown and the changes already occurring in the 
neighborhood cultural amenities that could attract people to the area already existed.  It 
was an area that had the potential to be attractive to young professionals and other 
individuals that desire urban living.  The major impediment to that was the stigma and 
blight attached to Clarksdale. The demolition of Clarksdale had the potential to spur more 





Another LMHA affiliate added: 
So we’ve broadened the scope of the development to include the rest of 
Smoketown and Shelby Park, and so what we’ve done here really is community 
development or neighborhood development.  The impact that it’s going to have on 
the east end adjacent neighborhoods will change the environment completely.  
The notion of spillover effects is very much about neighborhood development.  
Demolishing Clarksdale was expected to contribute more than a pretty façade.  It was 
expected to change the environment completely by increasing residential and commercial 
development.  A participant involved with the city recognized the impact that the 
development had. 
The changes that Liberty Green made to that side of the neighborhood and the 
way it links to the medical center were a big factor in changing NULU, or 
creating NULU.  
 
While the envisioned residential development did not come to fruition, the demolition of 
Clarksdale did induce commercial development.  Erasing the visible signs of blight did 
make the area more attractive to businesses, evidenced by the growth of businesses on 
East Market or NULU.  Another city representative talked about the impact that Liberty 
Green had on the area as it relates to NULU. 
 
If you think of the analogy of throwing a pebble into a pond, and then you start to 
see the ripple effect of the concentric circles.  They go out from there.  That’s 
what’s happened at Liberty Green as it relates to downtown. Liberty Green was 
happened simultaneously with East Market Street, which is now called NULU.  
So what you’ve got now is north of that area of where Liberty Green sits is this 
new trendy type of district, where you’re having younger professionals move into 
the area.  There are opportunities once the housing market completely turns 
around for those single-family homes to be built within that Liberty Green 
complex.   
Participants involved from two angles, LMHA and the city, recognized the changes that 




development having some kind of spillover effect.  The demolition was expected to and 
did have impact beyond the immediate borders of Clarksdale/ Liberty Green.  The 
revitalization was seen as spurring or happening simultaneously with the development of 
NULU.    
The revitalization at Clarksdale and its capacity for spillover played into the city’s 
efforts to revitalize downtown Louisville. Karman and Bittenbender (2001) reported on 
the efforts of the mayor to revitalize downtown. They asserted that: 
Redeveloping Clarksdale fits with [Mayor] Armstrong's initiative to create more 
residential opportunities throughout downtown. The mayor said an economically 
diverse neighborhood would be attractive to many medical center employees. 
Workers living there could walk to work, he said. Doctors and researchers 
working late or odd hours could go home for dinner, spend time with their 
families and still be able to return to work. 
Steven Spalding, executive director of the [Louisville Medical Center 
Development Corporation] LMCDC, said possible opportunities for Clarksdale 
residents include going to school part time at nearby Jefferson Community 
College and working part time at a medical center business. 
The [LMCDC] is designed to promote the medical center and attract new 
businesses to the district. 
"There's no question ... (a redeveloped Clarksdale) would be an advantage in 
marketing the area" to potential new businesses, Spalding said.  
First, Karman and Bittenbender (2001) contend that there were already initiatives 
underway to create more residential opportunities downtown and that redeveloping 
Clarksdale would help meet downtown housing goals.  The article mentions that diverse 
neighborhoods are beneficial but goes on to only talk about the way that the housing 
developed on the Clarksdale site would be beneficial to medical center employees.  
Having housing nearby the medical campus would be convenient for medical center 




developments are not about the people who lived there because they were rarely, if ever, 
able to move back.  The location of Clarksdale continues to play a key role and the 
residents who live there are secondary. 
In the years prior to the demolition of Clarksdale several downtown projects had 
taken place.  Downtown development included Slugger Bat Factory and Museum and 
expansion of the Louisville Science Center on West Main Street.  There was also the 
development of Waterfront Park, Louisville Extreme Park, and market rate townhomes 
and apartments (2002).  In addition, marketing was conducted to advertise downtown 
living through the Downtown Management District’s Annual Downtown Living Tour 
(Eigelbach 2012).  Other initiatives included the Downtown Housing Initiative Fund and 
the 1990 Downtown Development Plan (Housing Authority of Louisville 2002).   
With the blight and stigmas of Clarkdale erased there was a unique opportunity to 
attract new businesses downtown.  An editorial published in Louisville Business First in 
2007 examined the development of Liberty Green in relation to other projects occurring 
downtown. 
Let's resolve to go full speed ahead with the astonishing redevelopment of 
downtown Louisville. If we can keep all the major projects on course, the makeup 
of downtown by the end of 2010 will be hardly recognizable to Louisvillians 
today. You can't help but get excited about the planned 2010 opening of Museum 
Plaza4, the new arena and the Iron Quarter mixed-use center on Main Street. 
Throw in the second phase of Fourth Street Live, the University of Louisville 
Health Sciences Center at the old Haymarket site and the continued development 
of Liberty Green, and you can envision how dynamic our downtown will be.  
 This article provides further evidence of the growth occurring in downtown Louisville.  
There were several major projects underway that were completely changing the makeup 
                                                        




of downtown and Liberty Green was considered in context other projects occurring in the 
vicinity.  While this editorial does not explicitly mention the partnership between Liberty 
Green and the medical campus, it does allude to the proximity between the two. Here 
again we see the key role that the location of Clarksdale played in its selection for a 
HOPE VI site. 
Quantitative data also suggests that Liberty Green had an impact on commercial 
development.  The number of businesses that were opened in downtown increased 
between was 2003, a year before the demolition of Clarksdale, and 2005.  It is also 
important to note that the decline in new businesses coincided with the great recession of 
2008-2009 (see Chart 1).  One participant talked about the commercial development, 
particularly in NULU, that had occurred since the demolition of Clarksdale.  Louisville 
Business First reported on several new businesses that had opened in the area 
surrounding Liberty Green.  There were five stories between 2003 and 2012 that 
mentioned Liberty Green in reference to new developments.  There were reports on 
Gallery Square Lofts, Commonwealth Motorcyles, a downtown animal hospital, the sale 
of Wayside Christian Mission’s properties, the renovation of the Louisville Chemical 
Buidling across from Liberty Green, and the opening of Gebhardt Marshall Gallery. An 
additional report quoted the president of Bargain Supply, a long-time staple in the area, 
about the improvements in the neighborhood over the past ten years (Eigelback 2011).  
News coverage, the grant application, respondent accounts, and data on new businesses 
in the area are all in agreement that the revitalization of Clarksdale would be beneficial in 




 The revitalization at Clarksdale was not all about corporate development; it also 
was intended to assist in meeting a goal of creating 2000 new housing units in downtown 
Louisville (Housing Authority of Louisville 2002).  Lot selection for off-site 
development involved working with the city to include “emerging neighborhoods” where 
active revitalizations were underway. “HAL and its collaborators will create mixed 
Source: Louisville Metro Revenue Commission 
income developments in key locations across downtown and surrounding neighborhoods 
that are essential to rebuilding vibrant neighborhoods and a strong community” (HAL 
2002: Exhibit H.2).  It was important that the revitilization contributed to neighborhood 
development wherever replacement housing was built not just at the Clarksdale site and 
off-site replacement housing was intended to contribute to overarching downtown 
development goals. 
In discussing a development on E. Broadway that was part of replacing housing 
stock from the demolition of Clarksdale, Louisville Business First (2007) cites Mayor 




“The Phoenix Hill neighborhood certainly is experiencing a renaissance with 
Liberty Green, several private projects and this new retail and housing 
development," Louisville Metro Mayor Jerry Abramson said in the release. 
"When we redevelop urban neighborhoods, the influence spreads outside the 
boundaries of a particular project and into surrounding blocks.”  
This quote brings up the aim for spillover.  Liberty Green had an impact on the Phoenix 
Hill neighborhood, but more importantly we see that the city sought urban redevelopment 
opportunities had the potential to spread its influence.  In another article we also see that 
the development of Liberty Green was predicted to have an impact on other 
neighborhoods downtown. 
Other near-downtown neighborhoods such as Smoketown, Russell, and Old 
Louisville benefit from new housing being built on empty lots. 
The city will benefit from another award-winning, mixed-income neighborhood 
built so close to downtown and the medical center. (Louisville Business First 
2003) 
Across interviews, news coverage, and the grant application we see the discussion of 
spillover.  This rhetoric is important because it shows the emphasis given by multiple 
stakeholders to the potential for impact beyond the immediate territory of development.  
There are a variety of reasons why spillover is attractive to developers, policy makers, 
and city officials.  Spillover allows for projects to have a broader reach, but more 
importantly a project with the potential for spillover is more likely to attract more private 
investment.  This is crucial because of the financial constraints faced by local housing 
authorities and HUD.  At least one participant mentioned that the HOPE VI allocation 
from HUD is simply not enough and another participant referred to the process of using 
the HOPE VI allocation to leverage other funds.  Because of the limitations of funding a 
site with the potential to draw private investment is crucial in order to change the 




The location and the potential for spillover clearly played a significant role in 
Clarksdale being selected for a HOPE VI grant application and there is evidence that 
since the transformation there have been marked gains in terms of the physical structure, 
poverty rate, and crime rate in the neighborhood surrounding Liberty Green.  Visual 
evidence of the change was most salient when discussing the transformation of 
Clarksdale with participants.  Several respondents refer to the physical transformation of 
Liberty Green when assessing its outcome. A city representative offered: 
Well go out to Park Duvalle and you’ll see doctors living there with a $250,000-
$280,000 home and around the block you’ll see a public housing unit.  I’d say it 
works, wouldn’t you? 
A representative from HUD echoes those sentiments when asked how the HOPE VI 
developments in Louisville have fared in achieving what s/he considers to be the goals of 
HOPE VI. 
I would say very well.  I’m sure you’ve driven through Liberty Green.  In regards 
to one of the goals, which was to create a mixed-income community, it’s been 
very successful in creating those very different housing opportunities which 
would be rental and homeownership and multifamily housing all of the structure 
as well as the economic development because now you have the grocery store in 
Park Duvalle.  So I mean it certainly met some of the economic development 
goals as well as eliminated a food desert.  So yes I would say it met the goals very 
well and in terms of streetscape and how it appears in, how it blends into the rest 
of the community and I think from the departments perspective it’s done that 
incredibly well.   
Observations conducted at Liberty Green support these respondents’ accounts about the 
condition of Liberty Green.  Both participants undertake a visual approach to assessing 
the outcomes of HOPE VI developments.  In addition to acknowledging the economic 
benefits, they also refer to components that can be assessed from simply looking at the 
developments.  For these participants, seeing different types of housing units was clear 




One interview participant involved in city government refers to a physical aspect 
of HOPE VI development, but extends it to include the impact on property values stating,  
As far as just the eye test is concerned, you can see how things have changed and 
the newness in the area and just in terms of the overall… you know our crime rate 
in Liberty Green has gone down considerably relative to what it was when it was 
Clarksdale because you just, a new housing stock, new people come in, you’ve 
gotten other folks that were there that kind of separated themselves from each 
other so you don’t have some of the feuds that were prevalent at the time there 
showing themselves anymore.  
 
The success of this HOPE VI project was judged based on the surface level appraisal. 
These comments reveal that residents are indeed a secondary concern.  These respondents 
discussed the streetscape and the mixed income development, but their evaluations do not 
include whether the individuals that were relocated are better off or even the ways that 
mixed income communities are beneficial to low-income individuals.  Another 
participant involved in advocacy for affordable housing in Louisville also refers to the 
benefits of the physical transformation, but is much more critical of the changes that have 
occurred.   
Well I think Park Duvalle is still very pretty.  It’s not that old so we’ll see how 
that holds up, but it’s losing value.  I think it was a big mistake to not try and 
make it more integrated.  So it’s losing value.  So we can only guess what is going 
to happen there.  Liberty Green is doing well.  So in terms of has it raised the 
value of the neighborhood? Sure.  Has it made it better for the people that lived 
there? No.  
This respondent is critical of the evaluation criteria used by others in this study.  To this 
participant the main goal of HOPE VI is to raise property values and the development at 
Liberty Green has been successful in doing that.  This participant recognizes that the 
physical transformation creates visual appeal, however, it does not correlate to an 




In spite of the heavy reliance on physical evaluation criteria, there are other measures that 
can be used to evaluate the success of the development.  Census data can shed light on 
the transformation that occurred in the neighborhood.  Census tract 59 spans beyond the 
immediate territory of Clarksdale, therefore the changes that occurred are not consigned 
to the rehabilitation site, rather it reflects the shift in the neighborhood wherein 
Clarksdale was located. 
  According to the Census in 2000, before the revitalization occurred, the median 
home value in the census tract where Clarksdale was located was $63,800; post 
Revitalization, in 2010, the median home value was $142,000.  Furthermore, prior to the 
development of Liberty Green there were no homes valued above $199,999; today 14% 
of the owner occupied homes in the census tract where Liberty Green is located are 
valued between $200,000 and $299,999 (see Table 2). 
Table 2: Value of Owner Occupied Homes in Census Tract 59, 2000-2010 
 2000 2010 
Value (in dollars) Count Percent Count Percent 
    Less than $50,000 82 42.7 27 7.7 
    $50,000 to $99,999 99 51.6 25 7.1 
    $100,000 to $149,999 6 3.1 152 43.4 
    $150,000 to $199,999 5 2.6 97 27.7 
    $200,000 to $299,999 0 0 49 14 
    $300,000 to $499,999 0 0 0 0 
    $500,000 to $999,999 0 0 0 0 
    $1,000,000 or more 0 0 0 0 
Median Value $63,800 $142,000 






There were significant changes in gross rent in census tract 59 as well.  In 2000, 
prior to demolition of Clarksdale, 50.4% of the renter occupied units had rents less than  
$200, and after, in 2010, the number of units rented at the same rate decreased to 32.1% 
(table 3).  This change may indicate a loss of public housing units that occurred with the 
demolition.  The change may also reflect the income requirements of the new 
developments.  Individuals receiving subsidies in the new development are required to 
have jobs and, therefore, the minimum amount paid in Liberty Green would be higher 
than the minimum paid by residents at Clarksdale.  
Table 3: Gross Rent in Census Tract 59, 2000-2010 
 2000 2010 
 Count % Count % 
Specified renter-
occupied units 
2,258 100 1568 100 
  GROSS RENT     
    Less than $200 1,139 50.4 504 32.1 
    $200 to $299 246 10.9 231 14.7 
    $300 to $499 405 17.9 271 17.3 
    $500 to $749 386 17.1 377 24 
    $750 to $999 39 1.7 185 11.8 
    $1,000 to $1,499 9 0.4 0 0 
    $1,500 or more 0 0 0 0 
    No cash rent 34 1.5 *  
    Median (dollars) 195  349  
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 3, 2006-2010 American 
Community Survey 
*No value not reported for 2010 ACS 
 
HUD’s goals of changing the physical shape of public housing and creating mixed 
income communities were both manifested in neighborhood development. The fact that 
Clarksdale was chosen for redevelopment, although there were other sites that were in 




opportunities were major factors.  As a result, there appears to be a correlation between 
the development of Liberty Green and economic growth downtown. After demolition the 
census tract containing Clarksdale underwent significant changes.  There were substantial 
decreases in the population, female-headed households, and poverty rates.   Evidence 
presented also suggests that there were increases in income and changes in racial 
demography.  The data already presented suggests that there is a correlation between the 
development of Liberty Green and neighborhood development goals including increased 
property values and commercial development, but what impact has this had on the 
residents who lived there?   
Impact on the Lives of Residents 
With HOPE VI developments there is a potential for residents to be displaced in 
spite of the best efforts to ensure that it does not happen.  Public housing residents are 
faced with changing their physical location, which impacts their daily lives in a number 
of ways.  They may end up dealing with the private housing market and challenges they 
never faced before. There is the potential that they could lose some social capital like 
informal childcare or access to public transportation. A comment from one participant 
perfectly sums up the tension between physical development benefits and the costs to 
residents 
I think there’s just been a lot of policy changes that have had unforeseen 
consequences on public housing so, it’s like you and I could sit down and come 
up with what we think would be the best housing, public housing model in the 




into place elsewhere in the government that would then have an impact on 
that.  So, I think it’s all just a big social experiment frankly. 
The HOPE VI program may have been created with the best of intentions, but changing 
the physical shape of public housing has had latent consequences on the people who live 
in public housing and these changes are not always for the best. This is troubling because 
individuals living in public housing are fragile and these changes could have a major 
impact on their lives.  A respondent affiliated with LMHA discusses this very fact: 
One of the biggest criticisms about the HOPE VI program, that you’re losing 
public housing stock, and public housing stock serves your hardest housed folks.  
So [the housing authority] made that commitment for one-to-one replacement, but 
again it got back to the financial concerns.  Could you make a financial pro forma 
work where you’re placing all 713, I think is how many were actually public 
housing units?  And the other big concern was relocating, moving people from 
their homes and all the fears of that move as far as from residents’ concerns, and 
then just the logistics of getting people moved into another location and making 
sure they had all the resources that they needed.  And then another concern I 
guess was this was the first time the housing authority had to add a case 
management component to a HOPE VI. 
From this comment we begin to get an idea about those who live in public housing; they 
are the “hardest housed.”  People served by public housing tend to be very low income 
and may suffer from other issues such as disability.  They are people that may otherwise 
be homeless, hence the respondent’s concern about replacing all the units.  If public 
housing stock is lost then there is a population that may not be housed.   
Another respondent offers an alternative way consider public housing residents.  
According to the respondent individuals of in low-income neighborhoods are often 
members of protected classes.  
I don’t know if you know all of the protected classes for fair housing, but race, 




presence of children and to be declared a protected class, it isn’t winning the 
lottery.  A protected class is declared to be a protected class because there are 
hundreds of years of both legal and extralegal disenfranchisement, politically in 
access to capital, in access to employment, and in access to education.  So it’s not 
yippee, I’m in a protected class, God finally somebody is recognizing that we 
have been excluded from all of these really important systems, and so knowing 
that it is not, as I always say rocket surgery, to figure out people in many of these 
protected classes, are going to be disproportionately lower income.  So where 
people of low income live becomes a fair housing issue.   
This respondent broaches the issue of fair housing.  The individuals utilizing public 
housing tend to be marginalized and muted.  Thinking about them as members of 
protected classes communicates the gravity of their social position and the necessity of 
caution in the relocation process.  Census data reiterates the participant’s observation 
about protected classes.  Between 2000 and 2010 the number of households in census 
tract 59 declined sharply from 2499 households to 1987 households.  After the demolition 
of Clarksdale the census tract was less densely populated. There was also a decline in the 
number of female-headed households from 742 in 2000 to 294 in 2010 (see Table 4).   
 
The female-headed households that were concentrated in Clarksdale were dispersed as a 
result of the demolition of Clarksdale.  This is concerning because these female 
Table 4: Households By Type in Census Tract 59, 2000-2010 
Household Type 
2000 2010 
Count Percent Count Percent 
Total households 2,499 100 1987 100 
Family households 990 39.6 462 23.30 
      Male householder 248 9.9 46 2.30 
      Female householder 742 29.7 294 14.80 
Nonfamily households 1,509 60.4 1525 76.70 




householders could potentially lose some of their social capital such as informal childcare 
to which they had access.  
 African Americans were another protected class that may have been impacted by 
the demolition of Clarksdale.  Census Tract 59 was majority African American before its 
demolition and, while it remained predominantly African American, the percentage of 
African American residents decreased from 62.9% to 53.3%.  There were also increases 
in the percentage of whites and those who identify as multi-racial. These changes are 
shown in Table 5 below.  Reducing minority concentrations is in line with the aims of 
HOPE VI, and this was achieved with the development of Liberty Green.  The benefits of 
integrated neighborhoods make this a desirable neighborhood development goal, but it 
does not necessarily translate into benefits for the people who live there, because, as 
Galster and Booza (2007) note, racial stereotypes may still mar interactions 
 
Table 5: Race in Census Tract 59, 2000-2010 
Race 
2000 2010 
Count Percentage Count Percentage 
Total: 5,071 100 3,805 100 
White alone 1,556 30.7 1,426 37.5 
Black or African American alone 3,190 62.9 2,028 53.3 
American Indian and Alaska 
Native alone 
31 0.61 9 .23 
Asian alone 83 1.6 31 0.81 
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific 
Islander alone 
0 0 0 0 
Some other race alone 5 .09 61 1.6 
Two or more races: 206 4.1 250 6.5 





The Income level of those living in Clarksdale and the surrounding area was majority low 
income, with 51.6% of the households in 2000 reporting an income of less than $10,000 
(see Table 6).  After the demolition of Clarksdale the number of households below 
$10,000 decreased to 36.1%.  There was also a large increase in those with incomes 
ranging from $25,000-34,999 from 8.2% in 2000 to 11.5% in 2010 and an increase of 
households reporting income between $150,000 to 199,999.  This increased from 0.2% in 
2000 to 2.5% in 2010.  All categories from $15,000 to $199,999 increased between 2000 
and 2010, especially $25,000-34,999, $75,000-99,999, and $100,000 and over. 
 
Median household income in the census tract also increased from $9,367 in 2000 to 
$15,439 in 2010. 
In the time between 2000 and 2010 there was a substantial decrease in 
unemployment from 9.3% in 2000 to 4.6% in 2010.  It is also important to note the 
Table 6: Household Income in Census Tract 59, 2000-2010 
Income 
2000 2010* 
Count Percentage Count Percentage 
Total households 2,499 100 1,987 100 
Less than $10,000 1,290 51.6 717 36.1 
$10,000 to $14,999 352 14.1 270 13.6 
$15,000 to $24,999 250 10 256 12.9 
$25,000 to $34,999 206 8.2 229 11.5 
$35,000 to $49,999 163 6.5 157 7.9 
$50,000 to $74,999 194 7.8 175 8.8 
$75,000 to $99,999 38 1.5 104 5.2 
$100,000 to $149,999 0 0 50 2.5 
$150,000 to $199,999 6 0.2 29 1.5 
$200,000 or more 0 0 0 0 
Median household income (dollars) 9367  15,439  
Mean household income (dollars) 23,363  28,491  
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 4, 2006-2010 American Community 
Survey 




decline population, which decreased from 3,722 in 2000 to 3,269 in 2010. This decline 
possibly could suggest that there are more students and retirees living in the area (See 
Table 7). 
 
Poverty levels also decreased between 2000 and 2010.  Overall the percentage of 
families below the poverty level decreased from 57.2% to 41.6%.  The percentage of 
female-headed households below the poverty level decreased from 73.8% to 67.2%.   
Additionally the number of individuals living in poverty declined from 57.7% in 
2000 to 44.1% in 2010 (see Table 8).  While there was decrease in poverty the poverty 
level did not go below the 30-40% threshold found by McClure (2008).  Therefore while 
the poverty rate decreased, the neighborhood could still be contending with the same 




Table 7: Employment Status of Population in Census Tract 59, 2000-2010 
Employment Status 
2000 2010 
Count Percentage Count Percentage 
Population 16 years and over 3,722 100 3,269 100 
In labor force 1,806 48.5 1,440 44.1 
Civilian labor force 1,806 48.5 1,417 43.3 
Employed 1,461 39.3 1,266 38.7 
Unemployed 345 9.3 151 4.6 
Not in labor force 1916 51 1,829 55.9 








After the revitalization of Clarksdale, the percentages of individuals with high school 
degrees through bachelor degrees in census tract 59 all increased (see Table 9). 
Surprisingly, considering the proximity to the medical center, the percentage of 
individuals living in the area with graduate and professional degrees actually declined.  
However, the population associated with Liberty Green has more people with higher 
levels of educational attainment than the population associated with Clarksdale. 
 
 
Table 8: Poverty Levels in Census Tract 59, 2000-2010  
Percentage of families and people whose income in the past 12 
months is below the poverty level  
2000 2010  
All families 57.2 41.6 
     With related children under 18 years 70 45.4 
     With related children under 5 years only 75.9 46.4 
Families with female householder, no husband present 73.8 65.3 
     With related children under 18 years 78.2 67.2 
     With related children under 5 years only 83.4 63 
Individuals 57.7 44.1 
     Under 18 years  44.9 
     18 years and over 49.8 43.9 
     65 years and over 43.7 41.8 
Related children under 5 years  52.6 
Related children under 18 years 78.7 43.5 
Related children 5 to 17 years 79.7 37.7 
Unrelated individuals 15 years and over 52.2 46.3 







The demographic character of census tract 59 experienced great change after the 
demolition of Clarksdale.  This may reflect a change in the population served by public 
housing as suggested by one respondent who stated: 
 So you asked me if public housing used to serve the poorest of the poor, 
absolutely, 100%, that is not true anymore. You already heard me talk about it 
and in one of our reports we actually analyze it and it’s worse now than it was 
about how many units that have been taken away from families and how many of 
the family units now have these higher income and behavior standards, not 
behavior so much as income standards than they did before. 
This statement reflects concerns the impact that the demolition of Clarksdale had on 
residents.  This respondent echoes earlier concerns discussed by another respondent 
regarding the loss of housing stock.  One-for-one replacement does not translate into the 
same number of families being served.  A HOPE VI development could replace the same 
number of units as the original development but have a higher proportion of one-bedroom 
units thus serving a different population.  Recall that between 2000 and 2010 the number 
Table 9: Educational Attainment in Census Tract 59, 2000-2010 
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 
2000 2010 
Count Percentage Count Percentage 
Population 25 years and over 3,087 100 2,639 100 
Less than 9th grade 279 9 194 7.4 
9th to 12th grade, no diploma 930 30.1 411 15.6 
High school graduate (includes 
equivalency) 
804 26 800 30.3 
Some college, no degree 519 16.8 577 21.9 
Associate degree 92 3 198 7.5 
Bachelor's degree 277 9 382 14.5 
Graduate or professional degree 186 6 77 2.9 
Percent high school graduate or higher 60.8 (X) 77.1 (X) 
Percent bachelor's degree or higher 15 (X) 17.4 (X) 





of households in census tract 59 declined from 2,499 households to 1987 households 
(Table 4). This could be indicative that Liberty Green houses fewer families than 
Clarksdale.  The respondent also suggests that the population of Liberty Green is more 
upwardly mobile than the population that was housed by Clarksdale.  In order to return to 
the new development, individuals are required to have a certain income and meet other 
requirements, such as no history of evictions, which were not obligatory at Clarksdale.  
Census data supports this supposition as well—median income increased from $9367 to 
$15,439 (Table 6). 
Concerns about potentially displacing residents was a major concern and at the 
forefront for participants in this study.  This is reflected by several factors, including that 
residents were included early on in the planning process.  A representative from LMHA 
discussed how a HOPE VI project starts with talking to residents. 
We require their participation and discuss what they want in terms of quality of 
life and services in these new facilities.  Then we apply for funds. Given the 
approval of HUD we begin to set up plans for the relocation of residents and 
providing services for them which includes total…we move them, we relocate 
them and they receive a stipend for their inconveniences.  Then they have an 
opportunity to go with section 8, housing vouchers, scattered sites, or traditional 
public housing.  
An individual involved with the city’s work on the development also discusses meeting 
with residents. 
In 2000 we had the planning meetings in the old gymnasium  at the Clarksdale 
site and that was a multi-day.  I guess it was a 3-day effort that involved the 
residents and multiple stakeholder interviews.   
Planners and organizers recognized the importance of including residents in the planning 
and acted accordingly.  There were measures taken to ensure that their voices were heard.  




Additionally residents were surveyed in order to access the Community and 
Supportive Services (CSS) activities in which they were interested.  Results suggested 
that residents were interested in tutoring/mentoring, youth training, GED training, 
computer classes, and vocational training (Housing Authority of Louisville, 2002).  These 
services were then offered to residents.  Measures were also taken to ensure that residents 
had a complete understanding of what was happening.  An affiliate of LMHA talked 
about how social workers relayed plans to each family. 
We have social workers, as a result of what they pick up at the hearings, they 
immediately go out into the complexes and contact them on site and they lay out 
the plans that would affect those individual families.  They have to cover every 
family 
In spite of the concern given to residents during the relocation process, there is constant 
tension between whether residents benefit or are disadvantaged from being relocated.  
Public housing residents are offered numerous services as they are being relocated.  One 
CSS involved assessing resident’s readiness to relocate.  There was also protocol in place 
to identify the families that needed the most help. Services provided by CSS included 
goal setting, planning, motivation, job retention, and advocacy (Housing Authority of 
Louisville, 2002).   
In spite of the fact that various protocols were in place, they did not assure 
residents would gain more than they lost by being relocated.  One representative from the 
city acknowledges that residents are given more options, but those options may not be 
what they want. 
You no longer see Cotter-Lang, you see Park Duvalle.  When Cotter-Lang went 
away and Park Duvalle came in there were hundreds of families displaced.  I 
mean you take away 2000 units and you put in a 1000 units and you think, hmm, 




had to begin.  Many residents didn’t want to go to scattered sites.  They don’t 
want to live out in Fern Creek.   
Residents are given choices about where they relocate but ultimately they must leave the 
neighborhood where they were located, and in doing so they may end up losing social 
capital.  One thing that may be affected is access to transportation.  The housing advocate 
discussed the use of public transit among public housing residents. 
Then you look at policies about transportation, which, 64%, no excuse me, 
somewhere in the 80s.  They had a survey, somewhere like 80% of the people 
who lived in Clarksdale, not Liberty Green, but Clarksdale used public transit as 
their primary source of transportation.  So anybody who believes in sustainability 
we blew out a really great community that relied on public transit.  Obviously, 
obviously, sustainability is not the issue.  It’s sanitizing people.   
Residents may also lose access to other sources of social capital as well as pointed out by 
a participant involved LMHA. 
Not only are they changing their physical locality and their support system of 
friends and family and the way they are transported back and forth to wherever 
they went every day.  You know to change their lives in that way and then say by 
the way you have all these services available to you, it’s kind of overwhelming.  
So it’s nice to have that one-on-one relationship with case management.  
Residents are faced with moving someplace they have no interest in living.  They may be 
losing out on their source of transportation and some of the social support that they had.  
While there were measures put in place to ease the transition they are no guarantee that 
individuals will be left better off. 
There are legitimate concerns about the ways in which HOPE VI may negatively 
impact residents.  At the same time that some study participants recognize the potential 
drawback of HOPE VI others see potential for residents to benefit from HOPE VI.  
According to a representative from HUD, HOPE VI is more than just housing.  It’s also 




As you may know public housing’s mindset was to just house people and it has 
moved to more than just bricks and mortar.  It’s making sure that the recipient has 
a choice of where they want to live.  It’s doing more than just providing bricks 
and mortar; it’s helping them.  I think the cliché is a hand up versus a hand out.  
Having some self-sufficiency on a personal level, as a family, incorporating other 
resources, and leveraging private resources to help a family become more 
successful in the sense of becoming educated, having support for families to get 
kids through the educational process. There are even programs helping them 
understand financial responsibilities, creating bank accounts, and things along 
those lines.  So it’s much more comprehensive than just putting them in a tall 
building and providing a shelter.  It’s more of helping them become more 
integrated in the community from a financially disadvantaged perspective. 
HUD’s requirements and self-sufficiency goals do reflect this shift in policy, however 
this study finds that housing people is first and foremost HUD’s goal.  HOPE VI does 
create a more integrated community that financially disadvantaged individuals have 
access to.  It is important to keep in mind that those with the most access to Liberty 
Green are likely upwardly mobile to some extent and that it is those that are upwardly 







In assessing how well the goals of local officials align with the official goals of 
HOPE VI, this study revealed that that there is not necessarily goal conflict on the part of 
decision makers, but the stated goals of HOPE VI themselves stand in conflict with one 
another.  Two major components of HOPE VI are in constant tension—the impact on 
residents and neighborhood development goals.  Evidence from this study suggests that 
while self-sufficiency is a goal of the HOPE VI program, it is secondary.  Most of the 
emphasis for the HOPE VI program revolves around neighborhood and community 
development.  Demolition has been the route selected toward this end and it has the 
potential to negatively impact public housing residents. 
The Clarksdale Revitalization plan stated that its goal was to utilize the location 
of Clarksdale to develop a more livable community for its residents and neighbors 
(Housing Authority of Louisville 2002).  Changing the physical shape of public housing 
and thus neighborhood development were the primary goals of this HOPE VI 
development.  Data presented in this study reiterated the importance of the location of 
Clarksdale for this development goal. 
Physical distress, while a primary factor, was not the determining factor for 




poorer conditions at Parkway Place, and crime rate data revealed that Clarksdale was not 
the site with the most crime a year before demolition.  The main difference between 
Clarksdale and the other projects that could have been considered was location.   
Downtown Louisville was already experiencing an “urban renaissance,” and the 
demolition of Clarksdale had great potential to add to and benefit from downtown 
development goals.  The number of businesses downtown was increased between 2003 
and 2005 and erasing the blight and rebranding Clarksdale as desirable had the potential 
to raise property values and attract more businesses.  Reports from Louisville Business 
First indicate that there was a surge of new businesses after the demolition of Clarksdale, 
and Census data reveal that property values did increase.  The median value of homes 
increased $78,200 from $63,800 to $142,000.  In terms of neighborhood development 
goals, census data suggests that poverty in Phoenix Hill and Butchertown neighborhoods 
has decreased.  The physical shape of public housing has changed as well.  Study 
participants referred to changes in the physical shape of public housing when assessing 
the outcomes of the development at Liberty Green.  Overall census data and news 
coverage provide evidence that the development at Liberty Green is correlated with 
neighborhood development.  There has been a decrease in poverty in the neighborhood 
and several new businesses have opened in surrounding area, both of which have helped 
improve the tax base in downtown Louisville. 
Much of the emphasis of Louisville’s Clarksdale/ Liberty Green HOPE VI grant 
is on neighborhood development and the benefits of mixed income communities.  The 
perspective of neighborhood effects, much like the assessments of participants included 




including low income individuals (Young 2003).  Some studies have shown evidence that 
high school graduation rates, childhood cognitive development, and teenage pregnancy 
are sensitive to neighborhood effects.  Other studies, however, have found that physical 
proximity does not ensure social contact, or social cohesion (Smith 1999).  After a 
revitalization project in Boston, residents had fewer social ties and there was not much 
social mixing and interacting between groups.   
In spite of the less-than-convincing benefits of mixed-income communities, study 
participants still continue to cite the development of mixed income communities as a 
prerequisite of HOPE VI projects.  Whether or not residents at Liberty Green have 
benefitted from living in a mixed-income community is beyond the scope of this study, 
however it is clear that neighborhood development was the primary goal of the 
revitalization of Liberty Green. 
With the emphasis on design we end up with beautiful developments, which may 
offer better living condition for low-income individuals.  Officials involved in the 
planning process for Liberty Green recognized the precarious position of the residents 
affected by the demolition of Clarksdale and acted accordingly.  Residents were included 
in the early stages of the planning process and their involvement was solicited in order to 
design the CSS activities. However, census data show that there were marked changes in 
the demographic character of Liberty Green; therefore, the population served by 
Clarksdale is very different than the population served by Liberty Green.   
Liberty Green has fewer female-headed households and African Americans than 




declined from 51.6% in 2000 to 36.1% in 2010.  Some of the most fragile people in the 
community were affected by the demolition of Clarksdale, and some participants in this 
study expressed concerns that the individuals that are relocated may lose some social 
capital such as social support and access to transportation.  While Clarksdale residents 
were offered first preference for Liberty Green, it is important to keep in mind that the 
individuals allowed to come back to the new development are required to meet standards 
that were not in place at Clarksdale.  The standards, such as income, are much higher, 
thereby excluding a significant number of the previous residents. Thus, those that benefit 
the most from these HOPE VI initiatives are those that were already upwardly mobile to 
some extent.   
Overall there are higher levels of educational attainment for individuals living in 
Liberty Green than there were for individuals who lived at Clarksdale.  There was also a 
decrease in the overall population, which may indicate that there are more students and 
retirees living in the neighborhood.  Future research may further investigate this change 
in population. We are beginning to see a shift once again in the population served by 
public housing.  The most disadvantaged are still housed, but they are not poised to 
receive benefits as much as those that are upwardly mobile.  The individuals that should 
benefit the most from self-sufficiency programming are moved to another neighborhood 
and potentially lose some of their social capital; what do they receive in return?  
Individuals may or may not be relocated to lower poverty neighborhoods, but as the 
literature shows this does not always produce the desired effects. The fact that the 
primary goal of HOPE VI is neighborhood development, one is left to conclude that 





This study has several important limitations.  First, respondents for this study 
were selected from a limited sample and some decision makers may have remained 
unidentified; therefore, the generalizability of this research is undetermined.  Furthermore, 
while this study concludes that neighborhood development was the primary goal of the 
HOPE VI development at Liberty Green, it cannot say whether former residents have 
prospered or been disadvantaged as a result of this development.  Future research should 
utilize resident interviews or tracking data from LMHA to address the impact the 
development had on Clarksdale residents.  Because this research employed a case study, 
it cannot be generalized to other HOPE VI developments.  Future research should 
investigate the goals at other HOPE VI developments across the country in order to 
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Interview Guide for Local Government Officals 
1. What are the major issues that Louisville faces today? Six years ago? 
2. How would you describe the housing market in Louisville? 
3. What can you tell me about public housing in Louisville? 
4. What is describe the process of implementing a HOPE VI grant? 
5. What role has the city council played in HOPE VI developments in Louisville? 
6. Were you involved in the process of redeveloping Park DuValle? 
7. What lesson did you learn from Park DuValle? 
8. Why was Liberty Green a good candidate for a HOPE VI grant? 
9.  Did those things inform the decisions made concerning Liberty Green? 
10. In your opinion, what are the goals of HOPE VI? 






Interview Guide for Lousiville Metro Housing  and HUD Officals 
1. What are the major concerns of LMHA? 
2. What can you tell me about public housing in Louisville? 
3. How has public housing changed over time? 
4. What is describe the process of applying for a HOPE VI grant? 
5. How do you choose which site to apply for a grant? Why was Clarksdale chosen 
over Park Hill or Beecher Terrace? 
6. What role have city officials played in HOPE VI developments in Louisville? 
7. Were you involved in the process of redeveloping Park DuValle? 
8. What lesson did you learn from Park DuValle? 
9.  Did those things inform the decisions made concerning Liberty Green? 
10. What plans does LMHA have for the future? 
11. How do private investors fit into the process? 
12. In your opinion, what are the goals of HOPE VI? 
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